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Question 620
A campus switch receives DHCP responses from a user-controlled device posing as the network DHCP server. Which safeguard best reduces the deployment risk in this case?
- Keep the authorized DHCP relay/server paths documented and monitored
- Require explicit deny checks whenever guest roles or VLAN mappings change
- Document key rotation, supported client transition and immediate incident response
- Maintain an approved AP inventory and a safe containment procedure
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Incorrect trust mapping can cause a general addressing outage. Functionality and protection must both pass.
Incorrect Answers
B:A template error can expose protected systems at scale. In this situation, incorrect trust mapping can cause a general addressing outage.
C:A hurried change must not leave critical devices offline. It would not resolve the documented symptom; incorrect trust mapping can cause a general addressing outage.
D:Incorrect rogue classification can disrupt legitimate neighboring networks. By contrast, incorrect trust mapping can cause a general addressing outage.
Question 621
A campus wired network has a student who can forge another workstation's IP-to-MAC mapping. What is the most appropriate first technical change?
- Enable trusted-port DHCP snooping and monitor unauthorized offers
- Deploy supported dynamic ARP inspection with a valid binding source
- Classify the detection using BSSID, RF and wired-network evidence before containment
- Evaluate stronger device identity such as certificate-based authentication and role mapping
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Forged ARP frames can redirect local traffic without changing IP routes. The control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims.
Incorrect Answers
A:The access edge should block unapproved address services. By contrast, forged ARP frames can redirect local traffic without changing IP routes.
C:Neighbor networks can be visible without being unauthorized corporate equipment. It would not resolve the documented symptom; forged ARP frames can redirect local traffic without changing IP routes.
D:MAC address alone is not proof of device ownership. The relevant technical distinction is that forged ARP frames can redirect local traffic without changing IP routes.
Question 622
A campus wired network has a student who can forge another workstation's IP-to-MAC mapping. Which observation would best verify that the intended behavior is working?
- Test denied payroll access and permitted guest internet sessions after authentication
- Verify deprecated insecure services are disabled and administrative sessions use secure protocols
- Attempt an authorized controlled test with the revoked identity and inspect rejection events
- Compare accepted legitimate ARP and rejected spoofed frames in violation logs
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims. Forged ARP frames can redirect local traffic without changing IP routes.
Incorrect Answers
A:Negative and positive flow checks verify actual role enforcement. By contrast, the control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims.
B:A documented policy is not proof the old listener is closed. The relevant technical distinction is that the control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims.
C:Actual rejection proves revocation enforcement works. Here, however, the control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims.
Question 623
A campus wired network has a student who can forge another workstation's IP-to-MAC mapping. Which belief about the configuration should the team reject?
- Share a permanent administrator credential to avoid provisioning an individual contractor identity
- Assume VLAN tagging itself authenticates ARP sender addresses
- Assume any radio using the corporate SSID is part of the approved WLAN
- Assume hiding the guest SSID is sufficient to isolate internal services
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:L2 VLAN membership does not validate IP ownership. Forged ARP frames can redirect local traffic without changing IP routes.
Incorrect Answers
A:Shared privileged access defeats accountability and revocation. Here, however, l2 VLAN membership does not validate IP ownership.
C:SSID names are public and trivial to impersonate. The relevant technical distinction is that l2 VLAN membership does not validate IP ownership.
D:SSID visibility has no authority over network routing or policy. In this situation, l2 VLAN membership does not validate IP ownership.
Question 624
A campus wired network has a student who can forge another workstation's IP-to-MAC mapping. What should be included in the rollout plan to limit a foreseeable failure?
- Stage profile deployment and keep an authorized recovery enrollment path
- Require explicit deny checks whenever guest roles or VLAN mappings change
- Document key rotation, supported client transition and immediate incident response
- Plan static-IP exceptions so critical equipment is not blocked
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Binding-driven inspection must support authorized non-DHCP devices. The control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims.
Incorrect Answers
A:Certificate migrations can lock out large fleets. In this situation, binding-driven inspection must support authorized non-DHCP devices.
B:A template error can expose protected systems at scale. Here, however, binding-driven inspection must support authorized non-DHCP devices.
C:A hurried change must not leave critical devices offline. It would not resolve the documented symptom; binding-driven inspection must support authorized non-DHCP devices.
Question 625
A switch management process sends plaintext credentials over an older remote access protocol. What should the network engineer do to address this requirement?
- Investigate rogue AP identity and use supported wireless detection and incident response
- Replace insecure administration with supported SSH/HTTPS and approved authentication
- Use supported port rate limits, storm control or appropriate control-plane safeguards
- Review MAC limits and post-authentication role enforcement for bridged devices
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Encrypted management channels reduce credential interception. A documented policy is not proof the old listener is closed.
Incorrect Answers
A:Identical SSID text does not establish a trusted infrastructure device. By contrast, encrypted management channels reduce credential interception.
C:Rate-based protection can prevent one endpoint from exhausting shared resources. In this situation, encrypted management channels reduce credential interception.
D:One authenticated user should not automatically grant unrestricted service to all downstream hosts. It would not resolve the documented symptom; encrypted management channels reduce credential interception.
Question 626
A switch management process sends plaintext credentials over an older remote access protocol. What should the team inspect to confirm the result?
- Compare accepted legitimate ARP and rejected spoofed frames in violation logs
- Attempt an authorized controlled test with the revoked identity and inspect rejection events
- Compare certificate identity and authorization outcome on a genuine and spoofed test client
- Verify deprecated insecure services are disabled and administrative sessions use secure protocols
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:A documented policy is not proof the old listener is closed. Encrypted management channels reduce credential interception.
Incorrect Answers
A:The control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims. The relevant technical distinction is that a documented policy is not proof the old listener is closed.
B:Actual rejection proves revocation enforcement works. By contrast, a documented policy is not proof the old listener is closed.
C:Credential checks identify devices beyond easily copied MACs. It would not resolve the documented symptom; a documented policy is not proof the old listener is closed.
Question 627
A switch management process sends plaintext credentials over an older remote access protocol. Which misconception is most likely to obstruct a correct fix?
- Trust all edge ports so no DHCP offers are ever blocked
- Share a permanent administrator credential to avoid provisioning an individual contractor identity
- Assume any radio using the corporate SSID is part of the approved WLAN
- Hide Telnet behind a nonstandard port while continuing to transmit passwords in cleartext
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Changing a port does not encrypt traffic. Encrypted management channels reduce credential interception.
Incorrect Answers
A:That configuration lets a rogue server assign unsafe gateways. The relevant technical distinction is that changing a port does not encrypt traffic.
B:Shared privileged access defeats accountability and revocation. By contrast, changing a port does not encrypt traffic.
C:SSID names are public and trivial to impersonate. Here, however, changing a port does not encrypt traffic.
Question 628
A switch management process sends plaintext credentials over an older remote access protocol. What precaution is most important before the change is expanded?
- Review role permissions with the information security owner before broad rollout
- Maintain approved certificate lifecycle and revocation procedures
- Apply least-privilege administrative roles and MFA where supported
- Stage profile deployment and keep an authorized recovery enrollment path
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Secure transport is one layer of control, not the entire privilege model. A documented policy is not proof the old listener is closed.
Incorrect Answers
A:A broad authenticated role can still expose sensitive systems. Here, however, secure transport is one layer of control, not the entire privilege model.
B:Hardware replacement and loss should trigger credential control. In this situation, secure transport is one layer of control, not the entire privilege model.
D:Certificate migrations can lock out large fleets. The relevant technical distinction is that secure transport is one layer of control, not the entire privilege model.
Question 629
A school Wi-Fi SSID uses WPA2-Personal and a shared key has leaked to former students. Which configuration decision most directly resolves the situation?
- Transition the intended access to managed individual authentication or rotate compromised credentials
- Restrict API access to approved management sources and strong authentication
- Verify certificate revocation checking and the approved RADIUS trust policy
- Investigate rogue AP identity and use supported wireless detection and incident response
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:A shared leaked PSK grants anyone possessing it potential access. Revocation must be effective on the live WLAN.
Incorrect Answers
B:Device management interfaces are privileged targets. Here, however, a shared leaked PSK grants anyone possessing it potential access.
C:A previously issued but revoked credential should not grant indefinite access. In this situation, a shared leaked PSK grants anyone possessing it potential access.
D:Identical SSID text does not establish a trusted infrastructure device. It would not resolve the documented symptom; a shared leaked PSK grants anyone possessing it potential access.
Question 630
A school Wi-Fi SSID uses WPA2-Personal and a shared key has leaked to former students. Which check most directly demonstrates the desired network behavior?
- Compare accepted legitimate ARP and rejected spoofed frames in violation logs
- Probe management ports from approved NOC and guest sources
- Inject a controlled rogue offer and verify it is rejected while legitimate leases succeed
- Test that old credentials fail and authorized devices receive the correct role
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Revocation must be effective on the live WLAN. A shared leaked PSK grants anyone possessing it potential access.
Incorrect Answers
A:The control should distinguish authentic bindings from forged claims. It would not resolve the documented symptom; revocation must be effective on the live WLAN.
B:Access lists must allow operators while denying guests. By contrast, revocation must be effective on the live WLAN.
C:Functionality and protection must both pass. In this situation, revocation must be effective on the live WLAN.
HPE Network Campus Access Professional (HPE7-A01) Practice Tests
