Microsoft AZ-104 Exam Dumps, Practice Test Questions

A normal share snapshot does not automatically become a separate recovery-vault copy. Confusing snapshots with independent backups leaves a common deletion boundary.

More frequent snapshots improve point-in-time granularity while the share and snapshots remain available; they do not remove the shared deletion dependency.

SMB Reader grants authorized data reading, not restoration of content already permanently removed from the storage service. RBAC cannot recreate missing recovery copies.

Share snapshots provide point-in-time copies, but relying only on snapshots in the same share does not establish the independent managed backup retention requested after accidental share deletion.

Share soft delete can recover a deleted share within its retention window, but it is not a substitute for independently scheduled backup recovery points and retention.

Soft delete can restore a deleted share during its retention period, which is useful but does not schedule vaulted daily backup copies or supply the separate Recovery Services vault retention specified by the policy.

The snapshot is a point-in-time read-only copy. More Azure RBAC management permissions do not make the snapshot writable.

A new key can alter authentication, but it does not alter the snapshot’s immutable state. Replacing credentials is unnecessary and disruptive.

Longer retention keeps the point-in-time state available but does not change its read-only semantics. Writes must be made to a recovered live file path.

A capacity change is not necessarily a performance change. The investigator must compare the share's supported performance tier and actual throughput demand.

Reauthenticating clients does not increase file share throughput/IOPS limits when authentication succeeds and performance is the bottleneck.

SMB client concurrency settings cannot raise a storage share's service-side provisioned throughput or IOPS quota. Compare actual latency/throughput/IOPS metrics against the share's selected performance configuration before adjusting client behavior.

Reader grants management visibility but does not expand file-share capacity or overcome a quota.

More permissions cannot create storage capacity after the share reaches its configured quota. Authorization is already successful in this case.

Wider file-system ACLs do not increase the Azure Files storage allocation and would weaken least privilege without fixing the limit.

An in-place overwrite might restore a previous file version but would immediately replace current production content, contrary to the explicit requirement to keep it unchanged while investigating. Restore the file to an alternate location first and compare versions before any approved production update.

Quota determines capacity, not file history. It does not recover overwritten bytes from a backup.

A whole-share destructive replacement would disrupt unrelated files and violate the requirement to preserve the live content during review.

Cloud tiering explicitly reduces local content residency. The visible namespace does not prove that all byte ranges are present on the server for backup.

Changing a tiering policy does not necessarily recall all cloud-only file contents. A local backup may still see placeholders rather than the entire Azure file share, so use a cloud-aware backup strategy for the authoritative data.

A VSS snapshot can be supported for a cloud-tiered volume, but it does not automatically materialize cloud-only file content. Backing up placeholders alone is not equivalent to safeguarding the complete Azure file share.

Azure File Sync server endpoints must be supported paths on local volumes of a registered Windows Server, not UNC network shares or mapped NAS drives. A UNC-form path remains unsupported.

Granting Azure permissions to a NAS appliance cannot turn an unsupported network share into a registered Windows Server local volume path. The endpoint path restriction is a filesystem support boundary.

A File Sync cloud endpoint points to an Azure file share; a server endpoint points to a supported registered Windows Server local path. The endpoints are not interchangeable with a NAS SMB path.

Management metadata location does not change the client's negotiated SMB dialect. The transport remains noncompliant.

Azure RBAC role permissions do not weaken the SMB protocol and encryption requirements. Authentication and network confidentiality are independent.

At-rest encryption is separate from SMB transport security. A legacy protocol lacking required session encryption does not satisfy the in-transit policy.

Restarting a healthy Storage Sync Agent on Windows might reset server activity, but it does not initiate an Azure file-share cloud namespace change-detection job. Local USN journaling catches server-side edits; this upload occurred outside the agent in the cloud. Trigger the supported cloud-endpoint change detection command rather than restarting working infrastructure.

The Invoke-AzStorageSyncChangeDetection cmdlet targets cloud-endpoint changes, using cloud endpoint information, not a healthy server endpoint USN scan. No Windows USN event is created on the server by a separate upload to the Azure file share. The cloud endpoint must be enumerated and then the discovered change can sync down.

Azure File Sync recall retrieves content for files already present as tiered placeholders on the server. A new file uploaded directly to the Azure share has not yet been discovered into that server namespace, so there is no placeholder to recall. Initiate a cloud endpoint change-detection scan first.

Azure Storage maintains CORS rules independently for Blob, File, Queue, and Table services. The browser is sending an upload to the Blob endpoint, whose Blob service CORS configuration evaluates its preflight. A rule added only to the Queue service does not apply to a Blob OPTIONS request, even though both services share a storage account. Configure the actual target service instead.

Storage Blob Data Owner grants additional blob data and access-control capabilities but does not configure the origin and allowed HTTP headers returned during a browser preflight. A CORS preflight is evaluated by the service against its CORS policy before the browser sends the authenticated operation. Since the same credentials already upload from a server client, broadening RBAC would increase privilege without addressing the documented preflight failure.

Anonymous public access is unrelated to CORS browser policy and would expand data disclosure if enabled. A browser still applies the cross-origin rules to an authenticated PUT, and a storage service must respond to allowed preflight origins, verbs and headers. The scenario explicitly confirms authorization and network reachability; the missing control is Blob service CORS, not removal of access restrictions.