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Question 580
A branch engineer redistributes a static default route into EIGRP and advertises it to every site, overriding the intended hub defaults. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Allowing a nontransit branch to act as a query/transit path increases instability and query scope.
- A stale covering route can blackhole traffic and obscure the decommissioned subnet's true ownership.
- Overlapping site prefixes can cause ambiguous reachability and route leaks between branches.
- Uncontrolled default redistribution can reroute traffic through a low-capacity branch.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported design response is to filter or scope external default advertisements to the authorized EIGRP distribution boundaries.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A branch EIGRP router advertises remote routes back into its hub and occasionally becomes a transit path between hubs. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A campus advertises a /18 summary into the WAN but has no route for one constituent /24 after a building is decommissioned. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:This offered choice, “Overlapping site prefixes can cause ambiguous reachability and route leaks between branches”, addresses a separate concern. That option relates to this separate design case: A retailer adds 70 branches and reused 10.20.0.0/16 at several sites; the MPLS provider cannot distinguish the overlapping prefixes in the enterprise routing table. It does not answer the current requirement.
Question 581
A multivendor enterprise wants one consistent YANG representation for interface operational counters but each platform exposes vendor-specific native trees. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Assuming all leaves support event publication can create silent observability gaps.
- Generic models cannot be assumed to expose every proprietary feature.
- Incorrect model classification can produce malformed payloads or unsupported paths.
- Relying on one vendor-native path can break portability across the managed estate.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported design response is to prefer a supported OpenConfig model for common telemetry and document device-specific augmentations where unavoidable.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A routing telemetry client assumes every operational counter supports on-change updates and receives no updates on one platform. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A Cisco-only controller needs platform-specific wireless policies that are not represented by the organization's standard OpenConfig model. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A standards group needs an interoperable interface model but mistakenly calls every IETF YANG module an OpenConfig model. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 582
A building has two independent distribution switches but hosts use the physical IP of one switch as their default gateway. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Port-only classification can lose segmentation during mobility.
- Redundancy claims may not match actual hardware or software failover behavior.
- A configured backup switch cannot take over traffic directed at a failed physical gateway address.
- Independently bridging every redundant cable can cause STP blocking or accidental loops.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to design an appropriate first-hop redundancy protocol with a shared virtual gateway and verified uplink tracking.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: Users roam between wired fabric edge switches but their identity assignments change with switch port, breaking microsegmentation. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A remote campus uses two distribution switches and requires nonstop gateway access during a planned supervisor replacement. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: Multiple access switches connect to one distribution block through independent Layer 2 uplinks with a blocked redundant path. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 583
An organization needs any-to-any group-encrypted private WAN traffic but the new design proposes a traditional hub-and-spoke IPsec overlay with hub hairpins. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Overlay encryption overhead can create an otherwise invisible PMTUD blackhole.
- Hand-configuring every edge pair undermines scalable centralized policy and error control.
- Hub-and-spoke encryption can force avoidable tromboning and reduce availability.
- Using a flat transparent Ethernet VPN can expand broadcast and spanning-tree risk unnecessarily.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to evaluate GET VPN where supported for group encryption over a trusted routable provider network.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A branch uses IPsec overlay on broadband with 1400-byte effective MTU, but an application sends 1500-byte DF-set packets and stalls. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A network team manually builds static IPsec tunnels between every SD-WAN edge even though centralized overlay policy is available. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A customer needs private route separation for 12 branches over a shared provider backbone, not a single Ethernet broadcast domain. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 584
An enterprise uses hundreds of IPv4 /24s and proposes a single /16 summary although several component /24s are outside its administrative control. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Logical redundancy on the same physical uplink does not remove the single point of failure.
- Hand-maintained IPv6 routes can blackhole traffic when redundant paths change.
- A stale covering route can blackhole traffic and obscure the decommissioned subnet's true ownership.
- An overbroad summary can attract traffic for destinations that are not actually reachable through the summarizing router.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported design response is to advertise only summaries that fully cover owned reachable allocations; retain required exceptions or more-specifics at redistribution boundaries.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: An EIGRP deployment relies on a single aggregation router and an outage cuts off all downstream branches. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: An IPv6 deployment uses static gateways rather than a dynamic protocol across several redundant campus links. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A campus advertises a /18 summary into the WAN but has no route for one constituent /24 after a building is decommissioned. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 585
A 10,000-receiver IPTV deployment requires one-to-many traffic from known sources but still uses RP discovery for each stream. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Unconnected RP domains do not automatically share all active multicast sources.
- ASM rendezvous-point dependencies can add unneeded complexity for known-source services.
- A flat shared management network allows lateral movement and overbroad privilege.
- Blind group reuse can collide with other services and expose traffic unintentionally.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The supported design response is to evaluate Source-Specific Multicast using supported IGMPv3/MLDv2 and PIM-SSM where available.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: Two independent PIM-SM domains each use local rendezvous points but remote sources must be discovered across the domains. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: Two business units share one management VLAN with unrestricted access to each other's routers. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: An enterprise wants to expose a multicast stream to one receiver group but the original source uses a group address conflicting with a remote application. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 586
A BGP customer has two provider uplinks and wants automatic loss-of-transport detection when the BGP session remains Established over a stale recursive path. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Mismatched metrics can create unexpected asymmetry or congestion.
- Tunnel encapsulation overhead and underlay failure can create hard-to-diagnose IPv6 outages.
- Excessively aggressive detection can cause false adjacency resets and route churn.
- A logically Established session does not guarantee forwarding to its remote next hop.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported design response is to pair next-hop reachability and supported BFD or track-based detection with appropriate BGP convergence settings.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A network uses IS-IS with dual distribution routers and wants predictable traffic away from a low-bandwidth backup path. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: An organization needs to reach an IPv6 island over a provider network that carries IPv4 only for the next year. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A design team wants fast OSPF failure detection on long-running optical links without dropping stable adjacencies during occasional control-plane delay. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 587
Multiple access switches connect to one distribution block through independent Layer 2 uplinks with a blocked redundant path. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Redundancy claims may not match actual hardware or software failover behavior.
- Independently bridging every redundant cable can cause STP blocking or accidental loops.
- A cross-chassis bundle unsupported by the platforms can loop or suspend traffic.
- A configured backup switch cannot take over traffic directed at a failed physical gateway address.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The supported design response is to choose a validated loop-free logical bundle or routed-access topology if active-active use is required.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A remote campus uses two distribution switches and requires nonstop gateway access during a planned supervisor replacement. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: Two access switches uplink to a distribution pair; the architecture stretches one port channel across chassis without verifying multi-chassis support. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A building has two independent distribution switches but hosts use the physical IP of one switch as their default gateway. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 588
A video conference SD-WAN policy accepts tunnels with 1% packet loss but ignores sustained jitter above application tolerance. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Relying on one group key server can block onboarding or later rekeys.
- Monitoring loss alone can mark a path healthy while jitter still degrades media.
- Hand-configuring every edge pair undermines scalable centralized policy and error control.
- Unrestricted any-to-any reachability can violate inspection and data-flow requirements.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The supported design response is to include latency, jitter and loss thresholds appropriate to the application class.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: GET VPN group members can route between branches but new devices cannot obtain group security policy after a key-server loss. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A network team manually builds static IPsec tunnels between every SD-WAN edge even though centralized overlay policy is available. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A network wants a hub-and-spoke topology for finance traffic but allows any-to-any policy for all service VPNs. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 589
A design team calculates voice QoS bandwidth solely from codec payload bit rate and ignores RTP, IP and tunnel overhead. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- An average-rate target without burst control can still overrun downstream buffers.
- QoS on one hop cannot undo queueing loss caused at a later bottleneck.
- Oversized strict priority can starve lower-priority traffic and still harm voice.
- Underestimating overhead causes congestion even when aggregate codec bit rate looks safe.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported design response is to size admission and queue bandwidth using packetization and encapsulation overhead plus concurrent-call estimates.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: An enterprise edge allows a contracted 50-Mbps guest rate but users report voice degradation during microbursts despite the average staying under 50 Mbps. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A campus designs priority queues only on the access switch but ignores a congested upstream WAN edge. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: Video and voice both use one strict-priority queue, causing voice jitter when video surges. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 590
Branch A and B redistribute external BGP into OSPF, then advertise resulting routes back into BGP at the opposite edge. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Bidirectional uncontrolled redistribution can create routing loops and unstable metric selection.
- A plain stub area does not permit the branch ASBR to originate type-5 externals there.
- Weight affects only the local router and can leave other iBGP speakers choosing different exits.
- Allowing a nontransit branch to act as a query/transit path increases instability and query scope.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The supported design response is to use explicit route tags, prefix filtering, and redistribution boundaries to block feedback loops.
Incorrect Answers
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A remote branch uses an OSPF stub area but a design change introduces an ASBR that must redistribute external routes within it. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A BGP operator attempts to influence routes within one AS by changing the weight attribute only on one edge router. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A branch EIGRP router advertises remote routes back into its hub and occasionally becomes a transit path between hubs. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) (300-420) Practice Tests