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Question 640
A design extends SDA fabric across buildings on a WAN with 1500-byte MTU and assumes local campus performance will continue unchanged. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- An IP transit that removes fabric encapsulation may not automatically extend fabric segmentation end to end.
- Stretching a broad guest broadcast domain enlarges the fault and attack surface.
- Unvalidated WAN MTU/latency can silently fail tunneled endpoint traffic.
- Confusing LISP control messages with user traffic hides broken data-plane paths.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to evaluate supported multisite design with MTU, latency, encapsulation, and control-plane reachability constraints.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: An organization needs consistent segmentation across two SD-Access fabric sites connected by a routed MPLS service. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A fabric site needs a guest wireless SSID without extending the guest Layer 2 domain across the whole enterprise. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: An SD-Access architect assumes the fabric's LISP control plane transports all user packets like a data-plane tunnel. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 641
An acquisition introduces 172.16.0.0/12 internal networks but the network must hide finance VLAN prefixes from the partner site. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Overbroad route propagation undermines segmentation and increases exposure.
- MST region mismatch can create boundary behavior and unexpected spanning-tree paths.
- Extending VLANs across routed-access boundaries negates intended local Layer 2 containment.
- WoL fails if the NIC has no standby power or the magic packet cannot reach the sleeping endpoint.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The supported design response is to use targeted route distribution policy and VRF containment for sensitive prefixes.
Incorrect Answers
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A new MST campus region accidentally has a different VLAN-to-instance mapping on one distribution switch. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A routed-access campus needs equal-cost forwarding to two distribution routers while keeping each VLAN local to one wiring closet. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A switch must remotely wake office PCs overnight, but the access port powers down and the design assumes Wake-on-LAN works regardless of power state. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 642
A campus designs priority queues only on the access switch but ignores a congested upstream WAN edge. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Treating network control messages as ordinary bulk data can cause false path failures.
- A flat shared management network allows lateral movement and overbroad privilege.
- QoS on one hop cannot undo queueing loss caused at a later bottleneck.
- PIM adjacency alone does not ensure Layer 2 receiver registration.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to extend consistent class scheduling to each actual bottleneck along the end-to-end path.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A campus QoS policy gives low priority to routing keepalives and network monitoring, and routing adjacencies flap during congestion. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: Two business units share one management VLAN with unrestricted access to each other's routers. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A multicast network has active PIM neighbors but one edge switch suppresses IGMP reports after an access-layer topology change. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 643
An automation team expects NETCONF transactions over SSH to behave like stateless HTTP GET calls with no session or lock semantics. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- gNMI is not simply an HTTP REST path and requires compatible service endpoints.
- A wrong service-model label can create gaps in incident response and patch ownership.
- Treating NETCONF as generic REST can skip locking and commit safeguards.
- Concurrent uncoordinated writes can overwrite policy or cause inconsistent device state.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to design NETCONF operations around capabilities, RPCs, datastores and transactional edit/commit behavior where supported.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A monitoring team tries to exchange gNMI Get and Subscribe messages with a device that only exposes ordinary HTTP REST endpoints. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A development team consumes a managed runtime that deploys application code without administering underlying servers and calls it raw IaaS. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A NETCONF client edits a shared candidate configuration while another orchestrator is modifying the same device. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 644
A global company uses the old terms vSmart, vManage and vBond in documentation but assigns control and management functions to the wrong products. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Carrier-grade NAT can break designs that rely on arbitrary inbound connections.
- Misapplied route targets or broad redistribution can leak routes across tenants.
- Overlay encryption overhead can create an otherwise invisible PMTUD blackhole.
- Misassigned roles misdirect troubleshooting and can leave unprotected management paths.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported design response is to map Cisco SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator functions to their actual roles, including legacy labels.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: An industrial site uses 4G LTE as primary WAN, and its routing team assumes public inbound addresses remain reachable through carrier-grade NAT. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A global business wants to connect its datacenter and branches on two different MPLS L3VPN providers with no accidental route leak between customers. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A branch uses IPsec overlay on broadband with 1400-byte effective MTU, but an application sends 1500-byte DF-set packets and stalls. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 645
An EIGRP deployment relies on a single aggregation router and an outage cuts off all downstream branches. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Allowing a nontransit branch to act as a query/transit path increases instability and query scope.
- Assuming every higher-metric neighbor is a feasible successor can lead to unexpected reconvergence.
- Logical redundancy on the same physical uplink does not remove the single point of failure.
- An inaccurate summary can attract traffic to an unreachable branch subnet.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to introduce an independently reachable redundant aggregation path with planned metrics and bounded query behavior.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A branch EIGRP router advertises remote routes back into its hub and occasionally becomes a transit path between hubs. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A router receives two EIGRP routes for a prefix with different metrics and the design team wants deterministic failover. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: Branches summarize their local EIGRP networks at a hub-facing boundary, but a detached subnet is included in the summary. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 646
A service provider backbone runs IS-IS level-1 only across multiple areas, and distant branch routers cannot obtain interarea routes. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- A topology without level-2 interarea connectivity prevents the required interarea reachability.
- Assuming L1 adjacency across mismatched areas can leave parts of the fabric partitioned.
- Overrestricting area LSAs can remove routes that essential services depend on.
- Uncoordinated subnet selection creates overlapping or nonaggregatable IPv6 assignments.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The supported design response is to design an appropriate level-2 backbone with level-1/level-2 routers at area boundaries.
Incorrect Answers
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: New routers have valid IP addresses but IS-IS peers in separate areas never form a level-1 adjacency. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A branch OSPF design selects a totally stubby area but an application requires type-3 interarea routes rather than only the default. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard relates to another condition: A provider delegation contains 2001:db8:4200::/48 and the design requires 256 independent /64 LANs across 16 branches. It is not the direct risk evidenced by this case.
Question 647
A public safety campus requires independent operations from a corporate tenant even when both use the same distribution hardware. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Assuming all STP redundant paths can actively forward leads to incorrect bandwidth capacity planning.
- A configured backup switch cannot take over traffic directed at a failed physical gateway address.
- Shared chassis does not automatically imply network-plane isolation without route-policy controls.
- Simple link aggregation does not guarantee hitless supervisor or software maintenance.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to design separate VRFs and policy boundaries aligned to each tenant's compliance constraints.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A campus design requires both distribution uplinks active but the chosen topology uses classic STP on all Layer 2 connections. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A building has two independent distribution switches but hosts use the physical IP of one switch as their default gateway. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A new campus design requires maintaining service during both one uplink failure and one planned software upgrade. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 648
A switch QoS scheduler guarantees 30% to backup traffic and 80% to voice under full congestion, exceeding possible link capacity. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Marking packets alone does not guarantee queue service under oversubscription.
- Mislabeling bulk traffic as EF causes priority-queue congestion and unfairness.
- A primary-link shaper on a much smaller backup can trigger major provider drops.
- Impossible aggregate guarantees lead to unexpected arbitration or configuration rejection.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The supported design response is to create feasible bandwidth allocations and an explicit priority bandwidth budget that sums within supported scheduler constraints.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: A regional WAN prioritizes voice using a DiffServ marking but provides no scheduler preference on its congested egress link. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A campus uses DSCP EF for voice signaling, voice media, and backup traffic, causing priority queue overload. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: A 20-Mbps backup link replaces a 200-Mbps primary WAN but the shaper keeps its 200-Mbps limit after failover. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 649
GET VPN group members can route between branches but new devices cannot obtain group security policy after a key-server loss. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Relying on one group key server can block onboarding or later rekeys.
- Monitoring loss alone can mark a path healthy while jitter still degrades media.
- A WAN edge connected to the internet is not automatically part of a secure managed SD-WAN fabric.
- Unrestricted any-to-any reachability can violate inspection and data-flow requirements.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The supported design response is to design redundant supported key servers and registration/rekey recovery for the group encryption domain.
Incorrect Answers
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A video conference SD-WAN policy accepts tunnels with 1% packet loss but ignores sustained jitter above application tolerance. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
C:That hazard arises in a separate case: Branches will be migrated from static internet VPNs to SD-WAN customer edges but the design omits transport isolation and overlay security. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: A network wants a hub-and-spoke topology for finance traffic but allows any-to-any policy for all service VPNs. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Question 650
IP phones and cameras are scheduled for a new closet, but PoE budget is calculated only from the switch's total port count. Which specific risk makes the uncorrected design unacceptable?
- Untrusted STP control traffic can hijack the root or create forwarding instability.
- A missing or overbroad MAC limit creates unauthorized layer-2 expansion.
- Oversubscribed PoE can shut off critical phones or cameras during high load.
- Blanket removal of protection opens the entire access tier to rogue STP peers.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The supported design response is to calculate worst-case powered-device class demand, switch power supply budget, and redundancy headroom.
Incorrect Answers
A:That hazard arises in a separate case: An attacker plugs an unmanaged switch into a lobby edge port and advertises superior STP BPDUs, changing the root topology. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
B:That hazard arises in a separate case: A guest workstation port can learn hundreds of source MAC addresses because an unmanaged mini-switch is connected behind it. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
D:That hazard arises in a separate case: An access switch's BPDU Guard disables a legitimate downstream bridge, and the network team proposes disabling Guard on every port. It is not the failure mode evidenced here.
Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) (300-420) Practice Tests