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Question 700
A valid maintenance removes an obsolete neighbor but the diff gate flags all changes as equally harmful. Independently, reviewers flag this potentially unsafe practice for assessment: 'Drop the before-state as soon as new state is collected'. Which verification addresses that practice without assuming it caused the incident?
- Inspect critical assertions
- Inspect diff field selection
- Check artifact provenance and hashes
- Fail every change that differs byte-for-byte from baseline
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:No baseline prevents review. The intended behavior is: Auditability links test result to change.
Incorrect Answers
A:This checks fail on unexpected critical regression, not the named failure. Critical reachability must survive planned change.
B:This checks compare stable fields, not the named failure. Nondeterministic values can flood diffs.
D:Legitimate changes would be blocked.
Question 701
An internal automation API moves from a self-signed certificate to an enterprise-CA signed certificate. The specific implementation objective is to specify service identity. Which configuration best meets the stated requirement?
- Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service
- Use an arbitrary self-issued root without distributing trust
- Upload the plaintext private key into a publicly shared support ticket
- Include the DNS names clients actually use in the certificate request
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Hostname verification relies on subject alternative names.
Incorrect Answers
A:Files may be invalid or unused.
B:Untrusted roots fail client verification.
C:Anyone with the key can impersonate the service.
Question 702
An internal automation API moves from a self-signed certificate to an enterprise-CA signed certificate. The specific implementation objective is to protect private key. Which design action is most appropriate for this case?
- Assume a certificate's display CN always overrides missing SAN
- Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service
- Generate and store the service private key with restricted permissions
- Use an arbitrary self-issued root without distributing trust
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Private-key exposure compromises server identity.
Incorrect Answers
A:Modern clients verify SAN hostname identity.
B:Files may be invalid or unused.
D:Untrusted roots fail client verification.
Question 703
An internal automation API moves from a self-signed certificate to an enterprise-CA signed certificate. The specific implementation objective is to validate CA chain. What should the engineer implement for this specific objective?
- Install the leaf and required intermediate certificates with trusted root path
- Upload the plaintext private key into a publicly shared support ticket
- Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service
- Assume a certificate's display CN always overrides missing SAN
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:A valid leaf may fail if the chain is incomplete.
Incorrect Answers
B:Anyone with the key can impersonate the service.
C:Files may be invalid or unused.
D:Modern clients verify SAN hostname identity.
Question 704
An internal automation API moves from a self-signed certificate to an enterprise-CA signed certificate. The specific implementation objective is to validate handshake. Which adjustment would satisfy this particular constraint?
- Use an arbitrary self-issued root without distributing trust
- Test hostname, expiry and TLS chain from an actual client before cutover
- Upload the plaintext private key into a publicly shared support ticket
- Assume a certificate's display CN always overrides missing SAN
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:End-to-end test catches deployment mistakes.
Incorrect Answers
A:Untrusted roots fail client verification.
C:Anyone with the key can impersonate the service.
D:Modern clients verify SAN hostname identity.
Question 705
An internal automation API moves from a self-signed certificate to an enterprise-CA signed certificate. The deployment plan must both (1) specify service identity and (2) validate CA chain. Which TWO actions together satisfy those requirements? Choose TWO.
- Include the DNS names clients actually use in the certificate request
- Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service
- Assume a certificate's display CN always overrides missing SAN
- Install the leaf and required intermediate certificates with trusted root path
- Upload the plaintext private key into a publicly shared support ticket
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Hostname verification relies on subject alternative names.
D:A valid leaf may fail if the chain is incomplete.
Incorrect Answers
B:Files may be invalid or unused.
C:Modern clients verify SAN hostname identity.
E:Anyone with the key can impersonate the service.
Question 706
An internal automation API moves from a self-signed certificate to an enterprise-CA signed certificate. Three conditions must be met: (1) specify service identity; (2) validate CA chain; and (3) validate handshake. Which THREE actions form the narrowest complete plan? Choose THREE.
- Test hostname, expiry and TLS chain from an actual client before cutover
- Use an arbitrary self-issued root without distributing trust
- Upload the plaintext private key into a publicly shared support ticket
- Install the leaf and required intermediate certificates with trusted root path
- Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service
- Include the DNS names clients actually use in the certificate request
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:End-to-end test catches deployment mistakes.
D:A valid leaf may fail if the chain is incomplete.
F:Hostname verification relies on subject alternative names.
Incorrect Answers
B:Untrusted roots fail client verification.
C:Anyone with the key can impersonate the service.
E:Files may be invalid or unused.
Question 707
Clients still reject the new certificate because the requested DNS hostname is absent from SAN. Independently, reviewers flag this potentially unsafe practice for assessment: 'Assume a certificate's display CN always overrides missing SAN'. Which inspection most directly evaluates that practice?
- Inspect SAN and client request hostname
- Inspect chain building and trust store
- Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service
- Inspect key storage and access audit
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Modern clients verify SAN hostname identity. The intended behavior is: Hostname verification relies on subject alternative names.
Incorrect Answers
B:This checks validate CA chain, not the named failure. A valid leaf may fail if the chain is incomplete.
C:Files may be invalid or unused.
D:This checks protect private key, not the named failure. Private-key exposure compromises server identity.
Question 708
Clients still reject the new certificate because the requested DNS hostname is absent from SAN. Independently, reviewers flag this potentially unsafe practice for assessment: 'Upload the plaintext private key into a publicly shared support ticket'. What diagnostic evidence should first be collected to assess that practice?
- Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service
- Inspect chain building and trust store
- Inspect SAN and client request hostname
- Inspect key storage and access audit
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Anyone with the key can impersonate the service. The intended behavior is: Private-key exposure compromises server identity.
Incorrect Answers
A:Files may be invalid or unused.
B:This checks validate CA chain, not the named failure. A valid leaf may fail if the chain is incomplete.
C:This checks specify service identity, not the named failure. Hostname verification relies on subject alternative names.
Question 709
Clients still reject the new certificate because the requested DNS hostname is absent from SAN. Independently, reviewers flag this potentially unsafe practice for assessment: 'Use an arbitrary self-issued root without distributing trust'. Which focused check best tests this specific assumption?
- Inspect chain building and trust store
- Inspect key storage and access audit
- Inspect client TLS verification and served chain
- Assume a certificate's display CN always overrides missing SAN
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Untrusted roots fail client verification. The intended behavior is: A valid leaf may fail if the chain is incomplete.
Incorrect Answers
B:This checks protect private key, not the named failure. Private-key exposure compromises server identity.
C:This checks validate handshake, not the named failure. End-to-end test catches deployment mistakes.
D:Modern clients verify SAN hostname identity.
Question 710
Clients still reject the new certificate because the requested DNS hostname is absent from SAN. Independently, reviewers flag this potentially unsafe practice for assessment: 'Treat successful certificate file upload as proof browsers trust the service'. Which verification addresses that practice without assuming it caused the incident?
- Upload the plaintext private key into a publicly shared support ticket
- Inspect client TLS verification and served chain
- Inspect chain building and trust store
- Inspect SAN and client request hostname
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Files may be invalid or unused. The intended behavior is: End-to-end test catches deployment mistakes.
Incorrect Answers
A:Anyone with the key can impersonate the service.
C:This checks validate CA chain, not the named failure. A valid leaf may fail if the chain is incomplete.
D:This checks specify service identity, not the named failure. Hostname verification relies on subject alternative names.
Designing, Deploying, and Managing Network Automation Systems (350-901) Practice Tests