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Question 190
A research company stores confidential BigQuery datasets; a stolen valid identity could call the API from an unintended environment. Which implementation choice most directly delivers approved perimeter communication?
- Create a broad all-project ingress exception for convenience
- Configure explicit ingress and egress rules for necessary trusted processing paths
- Exclude sensitive BigQuery service use from perimeter coverage
- Treat a VPC subnet name as an authorized identity for service API egress
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Default restrictions need carefully scoped exceptions for legitimate cross-perimeter workflows
Incorrect Answers
A:Weakens perimeter boundary. Default restrictions need carefully scoped exceptions for legitimate cross-perimeter workflows.
C:Leaves target data path exposed. Default restrictions need carefully scoped exceptions for legitimate cross-perimeter workflows.
D:Name alone does not prove approved workload origin. Default restrictions need carefully scoped exceptions for legitimate cross-perimeter workflows.
Question 191
A research company stores confidential BigQuery datasets; a stolen valid identity could call the API from an unintended environment. Which validation would best establish proof of exfiltration resistance?
- Test an authorized notebook query inside the perimeter only
- Inspect IAM grants without crossing the API perimeter in a test
- Check bucket at-rest encryption status
- Try an unauthorized managed-service API access path across the perimeter and inspect denials
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:An IAM permission check alone cannot show the service perimeter blocks untrusted routes
Incorrect Answers
A:Does not prove outside calls are denied. An IAM permission check alone cannot show the service perimeter blocks untrusted routes.
B:Misses the additional boundary. An IAM permission check alone cannot show the service perimeter blocks untrusted routes.
C:Not managed API exfiltration control. An IAM permission check alone cannot show the service perimeter blocks untrusted routes.
Question 192
A research company stores confidential BigQuery datasets; a stolen valid identity could call the API from an unintended environment. Which operational action best maintains perimeter policy maintenance after launch?
- Dismiss all perimeter violation logs as expected noise
- Keep stale egress exceptions after workloads are retired
- Automatically allow any new project that requests access
- Review perimeter violation logs when workloads or service accounts change
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:New legitimate workflows can fail if policy remains stale, while broad exceptions invite data escape
Incorrect Answers
A:Can conceal attempted data movement. New legitimate workflows can fail if policy remains stale, while broad exceptions invite data escape.
B:Unnecessary escape paths remain. New legitimate workflows can fail if policy remains stale, while broad exceptions invite data escape.
C:Eliminates formal perimeter review. New legitimate workflows can fail if policy remains stale, while broad exceptions invite data escape.
Question 193
A payments application embeds API tokens in deployment variables and developers accidentally expose them in debug logs. Which architecture most directly meets the need for centralized secrets lifecycle?
- Keep tokens in developer-managed plaintext environment files
- Use Secret Manager with workload IAM instead of embedding long-lived tokens in source or logs
- Bake production API tokens into container images for portability
- Store rotating secrets in a team chat thread
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Centralized versions and scoped access reduce uncontrolled secret distribution
Incorrect Answers
A:Easily copied and leaked. Centralized versions and scoped access reduce uncontrolled secret distribution.
C:Secret persists in shared artifacts. Centralized versions and scoped access reduce uncontrolled secret distribution.
D:No access controls or version audit. Centralized versions and scoped access reduce uncontrolled secret distribution.
Question 194
A payments application embeds API tokens in deployment variables and developers accidentally expose them in debug logs. Which implementation choice most directly delivers secure secret retrieval?
- Give all projects access to every Secret Manager value
- Print retrieved secrets into debug logs for troubleshooting
- Grant secret administrator permissions to every application runtime
- Grant the runtime identity access only to its necessary secret versions and avoid logging values
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Secret protection depends on both authorization and application handling of retrieved material
Incorrect Answers
A:Breaks least privilege. Secret protection depends on both authorization and application handling of retrieved material.
B:Recreates exposure through observability systems. Secret protection depends on both authorization and application handling of retrieved material.
C:Ordinary access should not include lifecycle control. Secret protection depends on both authorization and application handling of retrieved material.
Question 195
A payments application embeds API tokens in deployment variables and developers accidentally expose them in debug logs. Which validation would best establish proof of secrets access boundaries?
- Prove the app can fetch a token but never test denied identities
- Test runtime retrieval and confirm unauthorized identities cannot access the secret
- Verify only that secret version metadata exists
- Check application container image scanning only
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:A successful secret-store write does not establish least-privilege access
Incorrect Answers
A:Does not establish isolation. A successful secret-store write does not establish least-privilege access.
C:Metadata is not runtime authorization. A successful secret-store write does not establish least-privilege access.
D:Cannot prove access to stored secret is bounded. A successful secret-store write does not establish least-privilege access.
Question 196
A payments application embeds API tokens in deployment variables and developers accidentally expose them in debug logs. Which operational action best maintains compromised token response after launch?
- Rotate the exposed secret and invalidate the old upstream credential as appropriate
- Update Secret Manager but leave the old credential valid at the upstream provider
- Keep previous active keys forever to avoid disruption
- Monitor only API request count after rotation
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Updating the stored secret alone does not necessarily revoke an already exposed token
Incorrect Answers
B:Exposed token can still be abused. Updating the stored secret alone does not necessarily revoke an already exposed token.
C:Increases compromise window. Updating the stored secret alone does not necessarily revoke an already exposed token.
D:Does not prove old credentials are invalid. Updating the stored secret alone does not necessarily revoke an already exposed token.
Question 197
A regulated analytics platform needs customer-controlled encryption keys and separate responsibility for data and key management. Which architecture most directly meets the need for customer-managed encryption governance?
- Rely on default provider-managed keys when the contract explicitly requires customer key lifecycle
- Use Cloud KMS customer-managed encryption keys for supported encrypted services
- Store application plaintext key files in source repositories
- Let the application database administrator also destroy the encryption key at will
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:CMEK gives the organization control over key permissions and lifecycle policies
Incorrect Answers
A:Does not satisfy customer control. CMEK gives the organization control over key permissions and lifecycle policies.
C:Creates uncontrolled key exposure. CMEK gives the organization control over key permissions and lifecycle policies.
D:Combines sensitive duties. CMEK gives the organization control over key permissions and lifecycle policies.
Question 198
A regulated analytics platform needs customer-controlled encryption keys and separate responsibility for data and key management. Which implementation choice most directly delivers separation between data and KMS admins?
- Grant all service identities Cloud KMS admin permissions
- Allow developers to disable keys without impact review
- Grant key use to designated service identities and key administration to a separate group
- Keep KMS policy as a readme with no IAM restrictions
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:An operator who can edit data should not automatically be able to destroy its encryption key
Incorrect Answers
A:Unnecessary write/control of keys. An operator who can edit data should not automatically be able to destroy its encryption key.
B:Can make protected data unavailable. An operator who can edit data should not automatically be able to destroy its encryption key.
D:Does not enforce separation. An operator who can edit data should not automatically be able to destroy its encryption key.
Question 199
A regulated analytics platform needs customer-controlled encryption keys and separate responsibility for data and key management. Which validation would best establish proof of correct key-bound service access?
- Test successful encryption with an all-powerful key administrator
- Check key name creation but no service integration
- Test authorized encryption operations and denial after removing a service account key-use permission
- Verify that the data table is queryable while leaving incorrect key grants unchanged
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A KMS key existing does not prove service integration or restricted use
Incorrect Answers
A:Not least-privilege service use. A KMS key existing does not prove service integration or restricted use.
B:Does not prove encrypted workload access. A KMS key existing does not prove service integration or restricted use.
D:Misses IAM boundary. A KMS key existing does not prove service integration or restricted use.
Question 200
A regulated analytics platform needs customer-controlled encryption keys and separate responsibility for data and key management. Which operational action best maintains key-disruption prevention after launch?
- Rotate every key abruptly without checking dependent services
- Monitor key state and planned rotations while validating recovery dependencies
- Monitor only key count rather than denied use and state
- Delete key backups or runbooks solely to reduce storage cost
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Disabling a key without dependency planning can make otherwise healthy services unable to access data
Incorrect Answers
A:Can interrupt access. Disabling a key without dependency planning can make otherwise healthy services unable to access data.
C:Cannot detect privilege or availability issues. Disabling a key without dependency planning can make otherwise healthy services unable to access data.
D:Harms recovery and governance. Disabling a key without dependency planning can make otherwise healthy services unable to access data.
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