Microsoft MS-102 Exam Dumps, Practice Test Questions

Create a Conditional Access policy scoped to the selected app and group, requiring MFA. is directed at a separate task: The identity team wants to require MFA for a specific sensitive cloud application rather than every app. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The investigation identifies whether the alert concerns an account or a particular session.

Define named IP locations then apply them to a properly scoped access policy. implements a different mechanism for: Users inside an approved corporate network must get different access treatment than employees connecting from unknown public Internet. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Review user risk and sign-in risk as separate Entra Identity Protection signals.

Configure and verify the option to unlock an account without changing the password in the supported identity environment. is directed at a separate task: A locked-out employee remembers their password but must unlock the account through self-service without a forced credential change. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The investigation identifies whether the alert concerns an account or a particular session.

A sign-in from an untrusted location triggers the expected MFA requirement. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: An analyst treats one suspicious sign-in as a permanent account-risk classification.

Administrators with the targeted role are challenged under the policy. is evidence of another system state: A Conditional Access policy must apply to administrator roles even when group membership changes. The acceptance evidence here instead is: The investigation identifies whether the alert concerns an account or a particular session.

On-premises test user changes appear in Entra for included organizational units. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: An analyst treats one suspicious sign-in as a permanent account-risk classification.

The evaluator ignored another applicable Conditional Access policy or actual membership. would fit a different circumstance involving: A new Conditional Access design is blocking employees who should be outside the pilot group. Here the actual symptom is: An analyst treats one suspicious sign-in as a permanent account-risk classification.

The Conditional Access policy excludes the app or required user group. is a plausible failure in another case: A sign-in to the sensitive app succeeds without an MFA requirement. It does not explain the current incident: An analyst treats one suspicious sign-in as a permanent account-risk classification.

The Temporary Access Pass lifetime or one-time-use setting was not constrained. would fit a different circumstance involving: A business wants to know whether a temporary authentication method will be valid only during an enrollment window. Here the actual symptom is: An analyst treats one suspicious sign-in as a permanent account-risk classification.

Target the relevant supported directory role assignments rather than a manually maintained static list. can be useful when a Conditional Access policy must apply to administrator roles even when group membership changes. However, it does not specifically achieve: A sign-in from an untrusted location triggers the expected MFA requirement.

Review user risk and sign-in risk as separate Entra Identity Protection signals. addresses another administrative need: The organization must distinguish risk that a user account is compromised from risk attached to one specific login. This question instead requires the outcome: A sign-in from an untrusted location triggers the expected MFA requirement.

Enable Microsoft Authenticator in the authentication methods policy. can be useful when a tenant wants to enroll staff in Microsoft Authenticator for supported push and passwordless authentication. However, it does not specifically achieve: A sign-in from an untrusted location triggers the expected MFA requirement.

Review the risky users report and relevant risk remediation details. is directed at a separate task: Security needs an audit trail of how a user's risk level changed after remediation. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: A sign-in from an untrusted location triggers the expected MFA requirement.

Inspect identity protection risk detections and the relevant user and sign-in risk levels. implements a different mechanism for: The organization must distinguish risk that a user account is compromised from risk attached to one specific login. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use Conditional Access location conditions together with a supported MFA grant.

Configure the number of methods required to reset in password reset policy settings. is directed at a separate task: The organization requires two recovery methods before a user can reset their own password. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: A sign-in from an untrusted location triggers the expected MFA requirement.

The contributing policy and matched user condition explain the block. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: The user signs in from an untrusted site but no MFA is requested.

Administrators with the targeted role are challenged under the policy. is evidence of another system state: A Conditional Access policy must apply to administrator roles even when group membership changes. The acceptance evidence here instead is: A sign-in from an untrusted location triggers the expected MFA requirement.

An eligible SSPR reset updates the corresponding source directory credential. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: The user signs in from an untrusted site but no MFA is requested.

Historical identity risk detections were ignored during the incident review. would fit a different circumstance involving: Security needs an audit trail of how a user's risk level changed after remediation. Here the actual symptom is: The user signs in from an untrusted site but no MFA is requested.

An unsatisfied device condition was misdiagnosed as a multifactor authentication failure. is a plausible failure in another case: The help desk resets MFA repeatedly while the compliant-device requirement still fails. It does not explain the current incident: The user signs in from an untrusted site but no MFA is requested.

Password writeback was not enabled or lacked necessary source-directory permissions. would fit a different circumstance involving: A password writeback project must permit eligible SSPR resets to update the source AD password. Here the actual symptom is: The user signs in from an untrusted site but no MFA is requested.

Review policy inclusion and exclusion targeting, and evaluate combined policies. can be useful when a new Conditional Access design is blocking employees who should be outside the pilot group. However, it does not specifically achieve: An emergency access account remains available during a test of the restrictive policy.

Target the relevant supported directory role assignments rather than a manually maintained static list. addresses another administrative need: A Conditional Access policy must apply to administrator roles even when group membership changes. This question instead requires the outcome: An emergency access account remains available during a test of the restrictive policy.

Choose the authentication method based on the actual sign-in dependency and operational constraints. can be useful when a sign-in architecture review compares cloud password hash sync against pass-through authentication. However, it does not specifically achieve: An emergency access account remains available during a test of the restrictive policy.

Inspect identity protection risk detections and the relevant user and sign-in risk levels. is directed at a separate task: The organization must distinguish risk that a user account is compromised from risk attached to one specific login. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: An emergency access account remains available during a test of the restrictive policy.

Review the risky users report and relevant risk remediation details. implements a different mechanism for: Security needs an audit trail of how a user's risk level changed after remediation. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use narrowly controlled Conditional Access exclusions for emergency access identities.

Review supported matching attributes and resolve conflicts before enabling the sync join. is directed at a separate task: A source Active Directory object has two possible cloud matches and a tenant fears duplicate identities. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: An emergency access account remains available during a test of the restrictive policy.

Administrators with the targeted role are challenged under the policy. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: All administrators are locked out after enforcing a new access policy.

The investigation identifies whether the alert concerns an account or a particular session. is evidence of another system state: The organization must distinguish risk that a user account is compromised from risk attached to one specific login. The acceptance evidence here instead is: An emergency access account remains available during a test of the restrictive policy.

The recovery flow demands two approved verification methods. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: All administrators are locked out after enforcing a new access policy.

Historical identity risk detections were ignored during the incident review. would fit a different circumstance involving: Security needs an audit trail of how a user's risk level changed after remediation. Here the actual symptom is: All administrators are locked out after enforcing a new access policy.

An unsatisfied device condition was misdiagnosed as a multifactor authentication failure. is a plausible failure in another case: The help desk resets MFA repeatedly while the compliant-device requirement still fails. It does not explain the current incident: All administrators are locked out after enforcing a new access policy.

The filter conditions did not exclude the service account's actual attributes. would fit a different circumstance involving: A business needs different attribute filtering rules for hybrid service accounts and employees. Here the actual symptom is: All administrators are locked out after enforcing a new access policy.