Microsoft MS-102 Exam Dumps, Practice Test Questions

The team never reviewed Defender endpoint software inventory and version evidence. would fit a different circumstance involving: A tenant wants to reduce risky applications by understanding installed software on managed endpoints. Here the actual symptom is: The laptop shows no new detections only because the endpoint sensor is inactive.

Defender vulnerability recommendations and affected-asset evidence were not reviewed. is a plausible failure in another case: The team assumes patched devices are safe without reviewing the inventory's remaining vulnerabilities. It does not explain the current incident: The laptop shows no new detections only because the endpoint sensor is inactive.

Policy alert context was not linked to its underlying activity evidence. would fit a different circumstance involving: Investigators must differentiate cloud app file-sharing policy alerts from raw individual user activities. Here the actual symptom is: The laptop shows no new detections only because the endpoint sensor is inactive.

Prioritize remediation using vulnerability exposure and affected device evidence. can be useful when a CVE affects one outdated application installed on a subset of corporate laptops. However, it does not specifically achieve: Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement.

Compare onboarded devices against expected device inventory and sensor-health status. addresses another administrative need: Security wants to track whether the Defender endpoint agent is enabled on recently provisioned machines. This question instead requires the outcome: Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement.

Use the supported security submission and time-limited allow workflow only after investigating. can be useful when a confirmed benign file is being repeatedly blocked by an overly broad detection. However, it does not specifically achieve: Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement.

Configure the supported Cloud Discovery data source and analyze discovered services. is directed at a separate task: Security must discover unsanctioned cloud services used through corporate network traffic. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement.

Review restricted entities, reset compromised credentials and unblock when safe. implements a different mechanism for: An infected mailbox account is placed in the Defender restricted entities list. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Configure supported Microsoft Defender attack surface reduction policies in an eligible management channel.

Configure the protected domain entries and corresponding phishing actions. is directed at a separate task: A global executive is frequently targeted by lookalike sending-domain impersonation. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement.

The device health view identifies the sensor or network communication problem. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A risky process remains allowed because the ASR rule was left in audit-only mode.

The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded. is evidence of another system state: A CVE affects one outdated application installed on a subset of corporate laptops. The acceptance evidence here instead is: Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement.

The team identifies both the policy condition and the user action that triggered it. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A risky process remains allowed because the ASR rule was left in audit-only mode.

The onboarding deployment mechanism did not reach or enroll the servers. would fit a different circumstance involving: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. Here the actual symptom is: A risky process remains allowed because the ASR rule was left in audit-only mode.

A per-message false positive was handled as a tenant-wide policy override. is a plausible failure in another case: Administrators disable phishing protections globally to release a single legitimate invoice. It does not explain the current incident: A risky process remains allowed because the ASR rule was left in audit-only mode.

Policy alert context was not linked to its underlying activity evidence. would fit a different circumstance involving: Investigators must differentiate cloud app file-sharing policy alerts from raw individual user activities. Here the actual symptom is: A risky process remains allowed because the ASR rule was left in audit-only mode.

Use a supported automated server onboarding deployment method. can be useful when a large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. However, it does not specifically achieve: The report links an exposure recommendation to the affected endpoint population.

Review endpoint sensor health and connectivity before assuming the device is clean. addresses another administrative need: Security needs to diagnose why an onboarded laptop has stopped sending Defender telemetry. This question instead requires the outcome: The report links an exposure recommendation to the affected endpoint population.

Use supported post-delivery remediation such as Zero-hour Auto Purge where applicable. can be useful when a malicious attachment was delivered and later discovered to be harmful by updated protection. However, it does not specifically achieve: The report links an exposure recommendation to the affected endpoint population.

Compare targeted device groups, policy status and actual endpoint protection configuration. is directed at a separate task: A Defender endpoint configuration appears deployed, but the devices are still in an unsafe state. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The report links an exposure recommendation to the affected endpoint population.

Deploy the applicable onboarding package or managed integration to eligible server groups. implements a different mechanism for: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management recommendations and exposure views.

Set an appropriate quarantine policy for the relevant detection class. is directed at a separate task: A team needs to distinguish email quarantine retention from deleting messages permanently. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The report links an exposure recommendation to the affected endpoint population.

Targeted endpoints show the expected protection setting and enforcement state. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: The team assumes patched devices are safe without reviewing the inventory's remaining vulnerabilities.

The device health view identifies the sensor or network communication problem. is evidence of another system state: Security needs to diagnose why an onboarded laptop has stopped sending Defender telemetry. The acceptance evidence here instead is: The report links an exposure recommendation to the affected endpoint population.

The team identifies both the policy condition and the user action that triggered it. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: The team assumes patched devices are safe without reviewing the inventory's remaining vulnerabilities.

Policy assignment was mistaken for successful device-side application. would fit a different circumstance involving: A Defender endpoint configuration appears deployed, but the devices are still in an unsafe state. Here the actual symptom is: The team assumes patched devices are safe without reviewing the inventory's remaining vulnerabilities.

Endpoint sensor health was not differentiated from a healthy no-threat state. is a plausible failure in another case: The laptop shows no new detections only because the endpoint sensor is inactive. It does not explain the current incident: The team assumes patched devices are safe without reviewing the inventory's remaining vulnerabilities.

The malicious domain was not blocked or was overridden by conflicting handling. would fit a different circumstance involving: An email administrator needs to block a confirmed malicious sender domain during an active campaign. Here the actual symptom is: The team assumes patched devices are safe without reviewing the inventory's remaining vulnerabilities.

Use a supported automated server onboarding deployment method. can be useful when a large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. However, it does not specifically achieve: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.

Use Defender tamper protection in the supported endpoint management configuration. addresses another administrative need: Endpoint operators want a tamper-resistant Defender configuration to prevent local disabling of protection. This question instead requires the outcome: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.

Use Defender XDR incident severity, status, affected assets and ownership for triage. can be useful when a SOC lead needs to triage open incidents according to impact and urgency rather than creation time alone. However, it does not specifically achieve: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.

Enable and scope tamper protection according to policy and tenant capabilities. is directed at a separate task: Endpoint operators want a tamper-resistant Defender configuration to prevent local disabling of protection. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.

Deploy the Defender for Endpoint onboarding configuration through Intune or another supported tool. implements a different mechanism for: A newly managed Windows laptop needs to appear in the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device inventory. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Prioritize remediation using vulnerability exposure and affected device evidence.

Configure the supported Cloud Discovery data source and analyze discovered services. is directed at a separate task: Security must discover unsanctioned cloud services used through corporate network traffic. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.