Microsoft MS-102 Exam Dumps, Practice Test Questions

Enable and scope tamper protection according to policy and tenant capabilities. is directed at a separate task: Endpoint operators want a tamper-resistant Defender configuration to prevent local disabling of protection. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.

Deploy the Defender for Endpoint onboarding configuration through Intune or another supported tool. implements a different mechanism for: A newly managed Windows laptop needs to appear in the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device inventory. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Prioritize remediation using vulnerability exposure and affected device evidence.

Configure the supported Cloud Discovery data source and analyze discovered services. is directed at a separate task: Security must discover unsanctioned cloud services used through corporate network traffic. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.

The hash indicator appears in applicable Defender policy and matching execution is blocked. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: The security team patches every workstation for an app not installed on most of them.

Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement. is evidence of another system state: Administrators want an endpoint attack-surface reduction rule to restrict risky behaviors. The acceptance evidence here instead is: The specific affected devices and fixed-version recommendation are recorded.

Overprivileged third-party app consent requests can be identified for investigation. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: The security team patches every workstation for an app not installed on most of them.

The onboarding deployment mechanism did not reach or enroll the servers. would fit a different circumstance involving: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. Here the actual symptom is: The security team patches every workstation for an app not installed on most of them.

Policy tuning was replaced with a broad protection shutdown. is a plausible failure in another case: The team disables all Cloud Apps alert policies after one noisy detection. It does not explain the current incident: The security team patches every workstation for an app not installed on most of them.

The response ignored cross-workload identity remediation even though the incident involved token theft. would fit a different circumstance involving: A security analyst finds evidence of token theft and must preserve the cross-domain case context. Here the actual symptom is: The security team patches every workstation for an app not installed on most of them.

Compare onboarded devices against expected device inventory and sensor-health status. can be useful when security wants to track whether the Defender endpoint agent is enabled on recently provisioned machines. However, it does not specifically achieve: Protected endpoints resist unauthorized changes to the controlled security settings.

Confirm policy applicability and device reported settings rather than relying on deployment intent. addresses another administrative need: A Defender endpoint configuration appears deployed, but the devices are still in an unsafe state. This question instead requires the outcome: Protected endpoints resist unauthorized changes to the controlled security settings.

Create a well-scoped advanced-hunting query to identify the defined anomaly in available telemetry. can be useful when an SOC wants repeatable analysis of unusual data exfiltration event patterns rather than manual clicking for each alert. However, it does not specifically achieve: Protected endpoints resist unauthorized changes to the controlled security settings.

Inspect vulnerability details and generate the list of impacted software installations. is directed at a separate task: A CVE affects one outdated application installed on a subset of corporate laptops. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Protected endpoints resist unauthorized changes to the controlled security settings.

Review onboarding and sensor-health reports for the newly provisioned cohort. implements a different mechanism for: Security wants to track whether the Defender endpoint agent is enabled on recently provisioned machines. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use Defender tamper protection in the supported endpoint management configuration.

Set an appropriate quarantine policy for the relevant detection class. is directed at a separate task: A team needs to distinguish email quarantine retention from deleting messages permanently. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Protected endpoints resist unauthorized changes to the controlled security settings.

The device health view identifies the sensor or network communication problem. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A local user disables protected endpoint security settings without resistance.

Targeted endpoints show the expected protection setting and enforcement state. is evidence of another system state: A Defender endpoint configuration appears deployed, but the devices are still in an unsafe state. The acceptance evidence here instead is: Protected endpoints resist unauthorized changes to the controlled security settings.

The verified benign file follows an approved exception without opening broad bypasses. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A local user disables protected endpoint security settings without resistance.

The onboarding deployment mechanism did not reach or enroll the servers. would fit a different circumstance involving: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. Here the actual symptom is: A local user disables protected endpoint security settings without resistance.

Quarantine lifecycle or retention behavior was misunderstood. is a plausible failure in another case: A legitimate email is unrecoverable because the team assumed quarantine keeps it forever. It does not explain the current incident: A local user disables protected endpoint security settings without resistance.

Domain impersonation protection was not configured for the organizational domain. would fit a different circumstance involving: A global executive is frequently targeted by lookalike sending-domain impersonation. Here the actual symptom is: A local user disables protected endpoint security settings without resistance.

Use a supported automated server onboarding deployment method. can be useful when a large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. However, it does not specifically achieve: The endpoint is isolated in the intended manner and the action is logged.

Onboard the eligible endpoint using a supported deployment mechanism. addresses another administrative need: A newly managed Windows laptop needs to appear in the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device inventory. This question instead requires the outcome: The endpoint is isolated in the intended manner and the action is logged.

Apply a narrowly scoped block using the supported Tenant Allow/Block List mechanism. can be useful when an email administrator needs to block a confirmed malicious sender domain during an active campaign. However, it does not specifically achieve: The endpoint is isolated in the intended manner and the action is logged.

Deploy the applicable onboarding package or managed integration to eligible server groups. is directed at a separate task: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The endpoint is isolated in the intended manner and the action is logged.

Submit the file for analysis and apply an eligible narrow allow if justified by evidence. implements a different mechanism for: A confirmed benign file is being repeatedly blocked by an overly broad detection. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use Defender for Endpoint device isolation when the device and platform support it.

Examine the quarantined evidence and submit a false-positive sample through the supported process. is directed at a separate task: A legitimate sender's recurring invoices are quarantined as phishing and the team needs a safe review workflow. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The endpoint is isolated in the intended manner and the action is logged.

An authorized reviewer can inspect the quarantined message within its retained window. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: Malicious outbound connections continue after the team only adds an incident comment.

A previously delivered harmful message is remediated according to available protection. is evidence of another system state: A malicious attachment was delivered and later discovered to be harmful by updated protection. The acceptance evidence here instead is: The endpoint is isolated in the intended manner and the action is logged.

Lookalike domain messages receive the expected policy verdict. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: Malicious outbound connections continue after the team only adds an incident comment.

The onboarding deployment mechanism did not reach or enroll the servers. would fit a different circumstance involving: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. Here the actual symptom is: Malicious outbound connections continue after the team only adds an incident comment.

The discovered app classification was not updated after the security review. is a plausible failure in another case: Approved business software continues to be flagged as an unsanctioned exception. It does not explain the current incident: Malicious outbound connections continue after the team only adds an incident comment.

The recipient or workload was outside the Safe Links policy scope. would fit a different circumstance involving: Employees frequently click newly discovered malicious URLs in incoming emails. Here the actual symptom is: Malicious outbound connections continue after the team only adds an incident comment.