Microsoft MS-102 Exam Dumps, Practice Test Questions

Open vulnerability management recommendations and filter by affected software and assets. is directed at a separate task: A security owner needs to review software weaknesses reported across managed endpoints. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Targeted endpoints show the expected protection setting and enforcement state.

Enable and scope tamper protection according to policy and tenant capabilities. implements a different mechanism for: Endpoint operators want a tamper-resistant Defender configuration to prevent local disabling of protection. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Confirm policy applicability and device reported settings rather than relying on deployment intent.

Add protected users or domains and apply the appropriate anti-phishing policy actions. is directed at a separate task: Users receive phishing messages impersonating the company's chief executive. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Targeted endpoints show the expected protection setting and enforcement state.

Targeted servers report active Defender onboarding and sensor health. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A policy is marked assigned but endpoints never receive or enforce it.

Endpoint policy reporting shows the selected ASR rule and observed enforcement. is evidence of another system state: Administrators want an endpoint attack-surface reduction rule to restrict risky behaviors. The acceptance evidence here instead is: Targeted endpoints show the expected protection setting and enforcement state.

The app appears classified as unsanctioned and eligible enforcement blocks its use. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A policy is marked assigned but endpoints never receive or enforce it.

Defender vulnerability recommendations and affected-asset evidence were not reviewed. would fit a different circumstance involving: A security owner needs to review software weaknesses reported across managed endpoints. Here the actual symptom is: A policy is marked assigned but endpoints never receive or enforce it.

The team never reviewed Defender endpoint software inventory and version evidence. is a plausible failure in another case: Administrators cannot identify devices using an obsolete runtime despite onboarding. It does not explain the current incident: A policy is marked assigned but endpoints never receive or enforce it.

Collaboration workload evidence was not included in the incident investigation. would fit a different circumstance involving: A suspicious Teams collaboration link is reported and security needs the collaboration threat context. Here the actual symptom is: A policy is marked assigned but endpoints never receive or enforce it.

Onboard the eligible endpoint using a supported deployment mechanism. can be useful when a newly managed Windows laptop needs to appear in the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device inventory. However, it does not specifically achieve: The inventory identifies unsupported versions and their device locations.

Compare onboarded devices against expected device inventory and sensor-health status. addresses another administrative need: Security wants to track whether the Defender endpoint agent is enabled on recently provisioned machines. This question instead requires the outcome: The inventory identifies unsupported versions and their device locations.

Use quarantined-message review and submission rather than disabling anti-phishing tenant-wide. can be useful when a legitimate sender's recurring invoices are quarantined as phishing and the team needs a safe review workflow. However, it does not specifically achieve: The inventory identifies unsupported versions and their device locations.

Deploy the applicable onboarding package or managed integration to eligible server groups. is directed at a separate task: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The inventory identifies unsupported versions and their device locations.

Review the recommended improvement actions and assign accountable owners for applicable controls. implements a different mechanism for: A chief information security officer wants a prioritized view of actionable security posture recommendations. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use the Defender for Endpoint software inventory and vulnerability views.

Build a hunting query with the relevant data source, fields and time window. is directed at a separate task: An SOC wants repeatable analysis of unusual data exfiltration event patterns rather than manual clicking for each alert. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The inventory identifies unsupported versions and their device locations.

The incident disposition records whether the impossible travel signal represents a real risk. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: Administrators cannot identify devices using an obsolete runtime despite onboarding.

The remediation owner can distinguish active exposure from a retired asset record. is evidence of another system state: A company wants to confirm whether exposure recommendations target obsolete or still-present assets. The acceptance evidence here instead is: The inventory identifies unsupported versions and their device locations.

Lookalike domain messages receive the expected policy verdict. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: Administrators cannot identify devices using an obsolete runtime despite onboarding.

The onboarding deployment mechanism did not reach or enroll the servers. would fit a different circumstance involving: A large fleet of Windows servers needs consistent Defender endpoint onboarding without manual portal actions. Here the actual symptom is: Administrators cannot identify devices using an obsolete runtime despite onboarding.

Endpoint sensor health was not differentiated from a healthy no-threat state. is a plausible failure in another case: The laptop shows no new detections only because the endpoint sensor is inactive. It does not explain the current incident: Administrators cannot identify devices using an obsolete runtime despite onboarding.

Policy alert context was not linked to its underlying activity evidence. would fit a different circumstance involving: Investigators must differentiate cloud app file-sharing policy alerts from raw individual user activities. Here the actual symptom is: Administrators cannot identify devices using an obsolete runtime despite onboarding.

Use the Defender for Endpoint software inventory and vulnerability views. can be useful when a tenant wants to reduce risky applications by understanding installed software on managed endpoints. However, it does not specifically achieve: All intended machines show onboarded and healthy Defender sensor status.

Use Defender tamper protection in the supported endpoint management configuration. addresses another administrative need: Endpoint operators want a tamper-resistant Defender configuration to prevent local disabling of protection. This question instead requires the outcome: All intended machines show onboarded and healthy Defender sensor status.

Use Defender XDR incident severity, status, affected assets and ownership for triage. can be useful when a SOC lead needs to triage open incidents according to impact and urgency rather than creation time alone. However, it does not specifically achieve: All intended machines show onboarded and healthy Defender sensor status.

Open vulnerability management recommendations and filter by affected software and assets. is directed at a separate task: A security owner needs to review software weaknesses reported across managed endpoints. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: All intended machines show onboarded and healthy Defender sensor status.

Enable and scope tamper protection according to policy and tenant capabilities. implements a different mechanism for: Endpoint operators want a tamper-resistant Defender configuration to prevent local disabling of protection. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Compare onboarded devices against expected device inventory and sensor-health status.

Compare incident counts and true-positive/false-positive classifications for the same period. is directed at a separate task: A management dashboard must distinguish increasing threat volume from an increasing rate of false positives. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: All intended machines show onboarded and healthy Defender sensor status.

The remediated account is removed from the restricted list and can send appropriately. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: Provisioned computers are assumed protected because the company owns them.

Eligible sessions are controlled and the disallowed download action is blocked. is evidence of another system state: A company wants to prevent sensitive file downloads during certain monitored cloud application sessions. The acceptance evidence here instead is: All intended machines show onboarded and healthy Defender sensor status.

The correction is reviewed while broad anti-phishing protection stays enabled. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: Provisioned computers are assumed protected because the company owns them.

Quarantine lifecycle or retention behavior was misunderstood. would fit a different circumstance involving: A team needs to distinguish email quarantine retention from deleting messages permanently. Here the actual symptom is: Provisioned computers are assumed protected because the company owns them.

Hunting filters failed to constrain the data source, time window or detection logic. is a plausible failure in another case: An investigator uses an unrestricted all-time query and mistakes old benign events for the incident. It does not explain the current incident: Provisioned computers are assumed protected because the company owns them.

Policy tuning was replaced with a broad protection shutdown. would fit a different circumstance involving: The security team wants a repeatable review of Cloud Apps policies that produced many false alarms. Here the actual symptom is: Provisioned computers are assumed protected because the company owns them.