Microsoft MS-102 Exam Dumps, Practice Test Questions

Conditional Access App Control session routing or applicability was not configured. would fit a different circumstance involving: A company wants to prevent sensitive file downloads during certain monitored cloud application sessions. Here the actual symptom is: An alert is closed based only on the distance between cities without evaluating VPN context.

The Cloud Discovery data collection excludes roaming endpoint traffic. is a plausible failure in another case: Remote users' SaaS traffic is absent because only office firewall logs are ingested. It does not explain the current incident: An alert is closed based only on the distance between cities without evaluating VPN context.

A tenant service-health view was mistaken for the advanced-hunting event dataset. would fit a different circumstance involving: A responder needs to search raw endpoint events for a suspicious process execution across many devices. Here the actual symptom is: An alert is closed based only on the distance between cities without evaluating VPN context.

Use Cloud Apps policy alerts to detect patterns and activity logs to inspect specific actions. can be useful when investigators must differentiate cloud app file-sharing policy alerts from raw individual user activities. However, it does not specifically achieve: Eligible sessions are controlled and the disallowed download action is blocked.

Investigate the Cloud Apps anomaly with user and session evidence. addresses another administrative need: An analyst sees an impossible-travel alert for a user with two distant sign-ins. This question instead requires the outcome: Eligible sessions are controlled and the disallowed download action is blocked.

Compare onboarded devices against expected device inventory and sensor-health status. can be useful when security wants to track whether the Defender endpoint agent is enabled on recently provisioned machines. However, it does not specifically achieve: Eligible sessions are controlled and the disallowed download action is blocked.

Configure the supported Cloud Discovery data source and analyze discovered services. is directed at a separate task: Security must discover unsanctioned cloud services used through corporate network traffic. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Eligible sessions are controlled and the disallowed download action is blocked.

Review the discovered app's users, IPs and traffic metrics where collected. implements a different mechanism for: A Cloud Discovery report shows a risky service but the team needs to know which employees used it. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use supported Conditional Access App Control session policies where eligible.

Open the user entity page and review associated alerts, activities and device links. is directed at a separate task: A SOC operator needs to look at the investigative history of an impacted user across several Defender XDR workloads. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: Eligible sessions are controlled and the disallowed download action is blocked.

The discovered-app list includes cloud usage not formally approved by IT. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A policy was defined but the browser session never reached Cloud Apps controls.

The review distinguishes high-risk applications from approved low-risk services. is evidence of another system state: A manager asks which shadow SaaS application poses the greatest risk to the business. The acceptance evidence here instead is: Eligible sessions are controlled and the disallowed download action is blocked.

Targeted endpoints show the expected protection setting and enforcement state. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A policy was defined but the browser session never reached Cloud Apps controls.

App discovery risk and actual usage evidence were not evaluated. would fit a different circumstance involving: A manager asks which shadow SaaS application poses the greatest risk to the business. Here the actual symptom is: A policy was defined but the browser session never reached Cloud Apps controls.

Contextual sign-in evidence for an anomaly was not reviewed. is a plausible failure in another case: An alert is closed based only on the distance between cities without evaluating VPN context. It does not explain the current incident: A policy was defined but the browser session never reached Cloud Apps controls.

A per-message false positive was handled as a tenant-wide policy override. would fit a different circumstance involving: A legitimate sender's recurring invoices are quarantined as phishing and the team needs a safe review workflow. Here the actual symptom is: A policy was defined but the browser session never reached Cloud Apps controls.

Apply a Sanctioned classification after the app passes organizational review. can be useful when a discovered app is safe for a specific business group and should no longer be treated as shadow IT. However, it does not specifically achieve: The report identifies the employee population and usage associated with the app.

Investigate the connector health and authorization state in Defender for Cloud Apps. addresses another administrative need: An app connector stopped reporting events after credentials or permissions changed. This question instead requires the outcome: The report identifies the employee population and usage associated with the app.

Enable Safe Links URL inspection for the eligible mail recipients. can be useful when employees frequently click newly discovered malicious URLs in incoming emails. However, it does not specifically achieve: The report identifies the employee population and usage associated with the app.

Configure a policy matching the failed-login pattern and choose an alert action. is directed at a separate task: A Cloud Apps administrator wants alerts for an unusual number of failed user logins. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The report identifies the employee population and usage associated with the app.

Review the connector status and renew required authorization or permissions. implements a different mechanism for: An app connector stopped reporting events after credentials or permissions changed. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Use discovered app usage drilldowns with user and source evidence.

Review the recommendation details and the devices/resources still reported as exposed. is directed at a separate task: A company wants to confirm whether exposure recommendations target obsolete or still-present assets. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: The report identifies the employee population and usage associated with the app.

The discovered-app report reflects cloud usage from off-network endpoints. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A risky service is classified but no one can identify the source users.

A newly public file triggers the intended security signal. is evidence of another system state: A SaaS security owner wants to monitor files shared publicly from a connected cloud application. The acceptance evidence here instead is: The report identifies the employee population and usage associated with the app.

The chronology shows who made each response decision and what evidence prompted it. would assess a different control. In this case it does not rule out the specific failure: A risky service is classified but no one can identify the source users.

The app was not formally marked unsanctioned in Cloud Apps policy workflow. would fit a different circumstance involving: A company wants to mark an investigated cloud app as prohibited for corporate use. Here the actual symptom is: A risky service is classified but no one can identify the source users.

The Microsoft 365 app connector was not fully authorized or enabled. is a plausible failure in another case: Microsoft 365 app activities never arrive in Cloud Apps after an incomplete connector wizard. It does not explain the current incident: A risky service is classified but no one can identify the source users.

Device provisioning was not reconciled with actual Defender agent onboarding and health. would fit a different circumstance involving: Security wants to track whether the Defender endpoint agent is enabled on recently provisioned machines. Here the actual symptom is: A risky service is classified but no one can identify the source users.

Use Cloud Discovery from supported endpoint or firewall/proxy telemetry. can be useful when security must discover unsanctioned cloud services used through corporate network traffic. However, it does not specifically achieve: False positive alerts decline without suppressing the core suspicious behavior.

Use discovered app usage drilldowns with user and source evidence. addresses another administrative need: A Cloud Discovery report shows a risky service but the team needs to know which employees used it. This question instead requires the outcome: False positive alerts decline without suppressing the core suspicious behavior.

Investigate the cause and resolve restricted entity status only after remediation. can be useful when an infected mailbox account is placed in the Defender restricted entities list. However, it does not specifically achieve: False positive alerts decline without suppressing the core suspicious behavior.

Inspect discovered apps, app risk indicators and associated user/traffic patterns. is directed at a separate task: A manager asks which shadow SaaS application poses the greatest risk to the business. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: False positive alerts decline without suppressing the core suspicious behavior.

Integrate eligible endpoint discovery data for remote devices and validate ingestion. implements a different mechanism for: An organization wants Cloud Discovery data for remote laptops that never traverse corporate firewalls. It does not configure the mechanism needed here: Tune policy conditions based on actual Cloud Apps alert dispositions.

Deploy the specific ASR rule with an approved mode to the appropriate device group. is directed at a separate task: Administrators want an endpoint attack-surface reduction rule to restrict risky behaviors. It does not produce the required configuration outcome: False positive alerts decline without suppressing the core suspicious behavior.