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Palo Alto Networks NetSec-Architect Practice Test 62

Question 610

Which validation most directly demonstrates industrial ot segmentation boundaries is correctly designed for EMEA public university? The security architecture board of EMEA public university is preparing a new Securing IoT Environments program. The stakeholders have given the following specific requirement: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. No existing change is being reverted; select the most directly justified architecture for this stated requirement.

  1. For EMEA public university: Fail the panel over to a different site subnet and validate permitted control traffic and device mapping.
  2. For EMEA public university: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.
  3. For EMEA public university: Check supported models and licenses in the proposed deployment and validate a test device-based rule.
  4. For EMEA public university: Generate a known local device conversation and verify it is observed at the collection point.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This checks the relevant industrial ot segmentation boundaries enforcement path rather than a distant symptom. Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. The expected evidence is Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C153; angle 2; architecture design; option considered: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID after address change, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where A building access panel loses its IP address while moving to a backup network and is wrongly denied. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C153; angle 2; architecture design; option considered: Fail the panel over to a different site subnet and validate permitted control traffic and device mapping.

C:

Device-ID license boundary addresses a different architectural concern, such as when an architect assumes every firewall model can enforce device-based rules without licensing or platform assessment. It does not establish industrial ot segmentation boundaries here. The decisive test is to run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

D:

Network sensor placement addresses a different architectural concern, such as when IoT discovery sensors placed on an internet edge miss east-west exchanges between campus operational VLANs. It does not establish industrial ot segmentation boundaries here. The decisive test is to run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

Question 611

Which design assumption should the architect REJECT when evaluating industrial ot segmentation boundaries for EMEA public university? The security architecture board of EMEA public university is preparing a new Securing IoT Environments program. The stakeholders have given the following specific requirement: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. No existing change is being reverted; select the most directly justified architecture for this stated requirement.

  1. For EMEA public university: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.
  2. For EMEA public university: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.
  3. For EMEA public university: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied.
  4. For EMEA public university: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Reject this assumption: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule. It does not establish industrial ot segmentation boundaries; the supported architecture is Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. Verify it by: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C153; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. It is consistent with the required outcome: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C153; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

C:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. It is consistent with the required outcome: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C153; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied.

D:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. It is consistent with the required outcome: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C153; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.

Question 612

Select TWO directly linked controls for EMEA public university: the architectural remedy and its decisive validation. The security architecture board of EMEA public university is preparing a new Securing IoT Environments program. The stakeholders have given the following specific requirement: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. No existing change is being reverted; select the most directly justified architecture for this stated requirement.

  1. For EMEA public university: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.
  2. For EMEA public university: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.
  3. For EMEA public university: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.
  4. For EMEA public university: Allow the documented telemetry endpoint and deny an unauthorized administrative connection.
  5. For EMEA public university: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This checks the relevant industrial ot segmentation boundaries enforcement path rather than a distant symptom. Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. The expected evidence is Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C153; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

C:

This directly addresses the recorded gap: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. The architectural control is Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. The decisive test is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. The objective is Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C153; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is an unsafe or insufficient shortcut for industrial ot segmentation boundaries: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule. The scoped requirement instead calls for Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. Case R152-C153; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.

D:

Medical IoT least privilege addresses a different architectural concern, such as when an infusion pump needs vendor cloud telemetry but should never initiate unrestricted RDP to corporate servers. It does not establish industrial ot segmentation boundaries here. The decisive test is to run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

E:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device profile drift response, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C153; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

Question 613

For International airport operator, which is the most directly supported architectural control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries? After International airport operator completed a limited security transformation pilot, reviewers observed a control gap: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. The case assumes the affected flows and dependencies have been traced and all unrelated systems are functioning; choose the narrow design repair before wider deployment.

  1. For International airport operator: Deploy supported Device Security passive discovery using existing network telemetry and nonintrusive collection sources.
  2. For International airport operator: Plan supported virtual metadata collection or protocol telemetry integrations from distributed sites.
  3. For International airport operator: Design Device-ID policy that references approved device attributes with site scope and mapping freshness checks.
  4. For International airport operator: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This directly addresses the recorded gap: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. The architectural control is Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. The decisive test is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. The objective is Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C154; angle 1; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This option addresses a different design objective: Passive asset inventory, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where Hospitals have unmanaged pumps that cannot accept scanning agents, and asset inventory is incomplete. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 1; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Deploy supported Device Security passive discovery using existing network telemetry and nonintrusive collection sources.

B:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device metadata collector coverage, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where Remote switches and wireless segments are invisible to the central Device Security asset model. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 1; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Plan supported virtual metadata collection or protocol telemetry integrations from distributed sites.

C:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID after address change, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where A building access panel loses its IP address while moving to a backup network and is wrongly denied. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 1; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Design Device-ID policy that references approved device attributes with site scope and mapping freshness checks.

Question 614

Which validation most directly demonstrates industrial ot segmentation boundaries is correctly designed for International airport operator? After International airport operator completed a limited security transformation pilot, reviewers observed a control gap: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. The case assumes the affected flows and dependencies have been traced and all unrelated systems are functioning; choose the narrow design repair before wider deployment.

  1. For International airport operator: Fail the panel over to a different site subnet and validate permitted control traffic and device mapping.
  2. For International airport operator: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.
  3. For International airport operator: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.
  4. For International airport operator: Compare known device inventories against collected protocol metadata and site identifiers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This checks the relevant industrial ot segmentation boundaries enforcement path rather than a distant symptom. Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. The expected evidence is Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C154; angle 2; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID after address change, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where A building access panel loses its IP address while moving to a backup network and is wrongly denied. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 2; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Fail the panel over to a different site subnet and validate permitted control traffic and device mapping.

C:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device profile drift response, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 2; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

D:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device metadata collector coverage, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where Remote switches and wireless segments are invisible to the central Device Security asset model. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 2; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Compare known device inventories against collected protocol metadata and site identifiers.

Question 615

Which design assumption should the architect REJECT when evaluating industrial ot segmentation boundaries for International airport operator? After International airport operator completed a limited security transformation pilot, reviewers observed a control gap: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. The case assumes the affected flows and dependencies have been traced and all unrelated systems are functioning; choose the narrow design repair before wider deployment.

  1. For International airport operator: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied.
  2. For International airport operator: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.
  3. For International airport operator: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.
  4. For International airport operator: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reject this assumption: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule. It does not establish industrial ot segmentation boundaries; the supported architecture is Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. Verify it by: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 3; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. It is consistent with the required outcome: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C154; angle 3; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied.

B:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. It is consistent with the required outcome: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C154; angle 3; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

C:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. It is consistent with the required outcome: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C154; angle 3; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.

Question 616

Select THREE linked elements for International airport operator: a supported architecture, the direct test, and the required outcome. After International airport operator completed a limited security transformation pilot, reviewers observed a control gap: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. The case assumes the affected flows and dependencies have been traced and all unrelated systems are functioning; choose the narrow design repair before wider deployment.

  1. For International airport operator: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.
  2. For International airport operator: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.
  3. For International airport operator: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.
  4. For International airport operator: Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied.
  5. For International airport operator: The approved device profile remains correctly enforced when its address changes.
  6. For International airport operator: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This checks the relevant industrial ot segmentation boundaries enforcement path rather than a distant symptom. Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. The expected evidence is Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C154; angle 4; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

B:

This directly addresses the recorded gap: Programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. The architectural control is Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. The decisive test is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. The objective is Operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Case R152-C154; angle 4; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows.

D:

The required result is operationally required controller access survives while unauthorized lateral traffic is denied. Apply this control: Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. Verify with: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.

Incorrect Answers

C:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device profile drift response, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 4; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

E:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID after address change, not the primary control for industrial ot segmentation boundaries. It would be relevant where A building access panel loses its IP address while moving to a backup network and is wrongly denied. Here the necessary evidence is Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary. Case R152-C154; angle 4; post-pilot control gap; option considered: The approved device profile remains correctly enforced when its address changes.

F:

This is an unsafe or insufficient shortcut for industrial ot segmentation boundaries: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule. The scoped requirement instead calls for Design risk-based OT zone boundaries with permitted protocol paths and change-control windows. Case R152-C154; angle 4; post-pilot control gap; option considered: Perform active vulnerability scans against controllers despite a no-active-probe maintenance rule.

Question 617

For Regional energy provider, which is the most directly supported architectural control for device profile drift response? The security architecture board of Regional energy provider is preparing a new Securing IoT Environments program. The stakeholders have given the following specific requirement: A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. No existing change is being reverted; select the most directly justified architecture for this stated requirement.

  1. For Regional energy provider: Design Device-ID policy that references approved device attributes with site scope and mapping freshness checks.
  2. For Regional energy provider: Use supported Device Security network segment context to distinguish overlapping-address asset populations.
  3. For Regional energy provider: Review Device Security subscription, firewall model and Device-ID feature support before designing policy enforcement.
  4. For Regional energy provider: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This directly addresses the recorded gap: A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. The architectural control is Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile. The decisive test is Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. The objective is Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. Case R152-C155; angle 1; architecture design; option considered: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID after address change, not the primary control for device profile drift response. It would be relevant where A building access panel loses its IP address while moving to a backup network and is wrongly denied. Here the necessary evidence is Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. Case R152-C155; angle 1; architecture design; option considered: Design Device-ID policy that references approved device attributes with site scope and mapping freshness checks.

B:

Shared subnet site identity ambiguity addresses a different architectural concern, such as when two plants reuse the same private IP range, causing aggregated Device-ID events to be assigned to the wrong equipment. It does not establish device profile drift response here. The decisive test is to replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

C:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID license boundary, not the primary control for device profile drift response. It would be relevant where An architect assumes every firewall model can enforce device-based rules without licensing or platform assessment. Here the necessary evidence is Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. Case R152-C155; angle 1; architecture design; option considered: Review Device Security subscription, firewall model and Device-ID feature support before designing policy enforcement.

Question 618

Which validation most directly demonstrates device profile drift response is correctly designed for Regional energy provider? The security architecture board of Regional energy provider is preparing a new Securing IoT Environments program. The stakeholders have given the following specific requirement: A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. No existing change is being reverted; select the most directly justified architecture for this stated requirement.

  1. For Regional energy provider: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.
  2. For Regional energy provider: Run non-destructive read-only supervisory traffic and an explicitly forbidden test service across the boundary.
  3. For Regional energy provider: Observe a representative pump session and check device class, vendor, model and evidence confidence.
  4. For Regional energy provider: Check supported models and licenses in the proposed deployment and validate a test device-based rule.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This checks the relevant device profile drift response enforcement path rather than a distant symptom. Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. The expected evidence is Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. Case R152-C155; angle 2; architecture design; option considered: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Industrial OT segmentation boundaries addresses a different architectural concern, such as when programmable controllers and engineering workstations share unrestricted policy although they have different roles. It does not establish device profile drift response here. The decisive test is to replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

C:

Passive asset inventory addresses a different architectural concern, such as when hospitals have unmanaged pumps that cannot accept scanning agents, and asset inventory is incomplete. It does not establish device profile drift response here. The decisive test is to replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

D:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID license boundary, not the primary control for device profile drift response. It would be relevant where An architect assumes every firewall model can enforce device-based rules without licensing or platform assessment. Here the necessary evidence is Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. Case R152-C155; angle 2; architecture design; option considered: Check supported models and licenses in the proposed deployment and validate a test device-based rule.

Question 619

Which design assumption should the architect REJECT when evaluating device profile drift response for Regional energy provider? The security architecture board of Regional energy provider is preparing a new Securing IoT Environments program. The stakeholders have given the following specific requirement: A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. No existing change is being reverted; select the most directly justified architecture for this stated requirement.

  1. For Regional energy provider: Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access.
  2. For Regional energy provider: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.
  3. For Regional energy provider: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.
  4. For Regional energy provider: Automatically expand every IoT allow rule whenever a device contacts a new internet host.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reject this assumption: Automatically expand every IoT allow rule whenever a device contacts a new internet host. It does not establish device profile drift response; the supported architecture is Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile. Verify it by: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. Case R152-C155; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Automatically expand every IoT allow rule whenever a device contacts a new internet host.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. It is consistent with the required outcome: Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. Case R152-C155; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access.

B:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile. It is consistent with the required outcome: Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. Case R152-C155; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

C:

This is a valid design/control/evidence statement in the specified case, not the assumption to reject. Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. It is consistent with the required outcome: Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. Case R152-C155; angle 3; architecture design; option considered: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

Question 620

Select THREE linked elements for Regional energy provider: a supported architecture, the direct test, and the required outcome. The security architecture board of Regional energy provider is preparing a new Securing IoT Environments program. The stakeholders have given the following specific requirement: A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. No existing change is being reverted; select the most directly justified architecture for this stated requirement.

  1. For Regional energy provider: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.
  2. For Regional energy provider: Review Device Security subscription, firewall model and Device-ID feature support before designing policy enforcement.
  3. For Regional energy provider: Automatically expand every IoT allow rule whenever a device contacts a new internet host.
  4. For Regional energy provider: Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access.
  5. For Regional energy provider: Selected enforcement points meet the actual supported Device-ID prerequisites.
  6. For Regional energy provider: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This directly addresses the recorded gap: A previously trusted smart camera starts initiating DNS and outbound destinations outside its expected behavior. The architectural control is Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile. The decisive test is Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. The objective is Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. Case R152-C155; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

D:

The required end state is Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. The architect must deploy Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile. and validate using Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. Case R152-C155; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access.

F:

This checks the relevant device profile drift response enforcement path rather than a distant symptom. Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. The expected evidence is Unexpected device behavior triggers review rather than silently widening its security access. Case R152-C155; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID license boundary, not the primary control for device profile drift response. It would be relevant where An architect assumes every firewall model can enforce device-based rules without licensing or platform assessment. Here the necessary evidence is Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. Case R152-C155; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Review Device Security subscription, firewall model and Device-ID feature support before designing policy enforcement.

C:

This is an unsafe or insufficient shortcut for device profile drift response: Automatically expand every IoT allow rule whenever a device contacts a new internet host. The scoped requirement instead calls for Review Device Security behavior deviations and require approval before expanding its allowed profile.

E:

This option addresses a different design objective: Device-ID license boundary, not the primary control for device profile drift response. It would be relevant where An architect assumes every firewall model can enforce device-based rules without licensing or platform assessment. Here the necessary evidence is Replay approved camera telemetry and anomalous destinations in a safe test segment. Case R152-C155; angle 4; architecture design; option considered: Selected enforcement points meet the actual supported Device-ID prerequisites.

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