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Question 830
For this case, select TWO complementary measures or outcome checks that directly resolve the problem: A MAC RADIUS device changes its network adapter and can no longer authenticate because its registered identifier is stale.
- Treat a MAC address alone as cryptographic proof of device ownership and elevate access privileges.
- Rotate every user's password without checking whether the endpoint sent an EAP response at all.
- Assume every 802.1X feature shown in an EX switch guide is identically supported in all Junos OS Evolved interfaces.
- Confirm the actual device and approved MAC record, then restrict the resulting authorization and add compensating controls.
- Only the inventoried device has the expected limited connectivity; rogue or unknown hardware is denied.
Explanation
Correct Answers
D:Confirm the actual device and approved MAC record, then restrict the resulting authorization and add compensating controls. This addresses the dependency that MAC-based identity is tied to the observed hardware address and can be spoofed; it is not strong user authentication.
E:Only the inventoried device has the expected limited connectivity; rogue or unknown hardware is denied. The specific steps required are to confirm the actual device and approved MAC record, then restrict the resulting authorization and add compensating controls.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Treat a MAC address alone as cryptographic proof of device ownership and elevate access privileges” does not address MAC-based identity is tied to the observed hardware address and can be spoofed; it is not strong user authentication.
B:“Rotate every user's password without checking whether the endpoint sent an EAP response at all” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a switch logs EAP timeout while the endpoint has no 802.1X supplicant, yet the operator rotates valid RADIUS passwords repeatedly. It is not a valid fix here.
C:“Assume every 802.1X feature shown in an EX switch guide is identically supported in all Junos OS Evolved interfaces” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an access switch is moved to Junos OS Evolved but the team assumes every earlier guest-VLAN feature still exists on L2 802.1X interfaces. It is not a valid fix here.
Question 831
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A switch logs EAP timeout while the endpoint has no 802.1X supplicant, yet the operator rotates valid RADIUS passwords repeatedly. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Choose a documented compatible nonbrowser method such as supported MAC RADIUS under narrow access controls.
- Inspect packet exchange and classify the endpoint before selecting a supported fallback method.
- Confirm the actual device and approved MAC record, then restrict the resulting authorization and add compensating controls.
- Assign the authenticated device to the authorized restricted network profile and verify effective VLAN/filter.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Supplicant absence is a distinct failure from an invalid credential or unreachable authentication server. Verify this by checking that the observed authentication state identifies missing supplicant response, and the approved method onboards the endpoint.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Choose a documented compatible nonbrowser method such as supported MAC RADIUS under narrow access controls” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a captive portal requirement is applied to a headless barcode scanner that has no web browser to follow its redirect. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Confirm the actual device and approved MAC record, then restrict the resulting authorization and add compensating controls” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a printer's MAC address is duplicated by an unauthorized endpoint that obtains the same weak MAC-based policy. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Assign the authenticated device to the authorized restricted network profile and verify effective VLAN/filter” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a MAC RADIUS policy authenticates a known camera but applies the broad employee VLAN instead of a camera-only network. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 832
Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: An EAP-compliant endpoint authenticates while the required policy attribute is absent or ignored in switch port authorization.
- Verify RADIUS attribute handling and model/release feature support before rolling out dynamic assignment.
- The switch reports an authorized session with the intended VLAN and access policy.
- Check returned RADIUS attributes and supported platform software, then enforce a valid authorization assignment.
- Assume any RADIUS Access-Accept forces a requested dynamic VLAN on every Junos switch variant.
- Add a static DNS record and assume it substitutes for captive-portal authentication and authorization.
- Mark every unknown MAC as trusted and give it unrestricted data-VLAN access.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Prevention of recurrence: Authentication success and postauthentication VLAN/policy assignment are separate stages whose feature support may vary.
B:Confirmation: Check returned RADIUS attributes and supported platform software, then enforce a valid authorization assignment.
C:Correction: Authentication success and postauthentication VLAN/policy assignment are separate stages whose feature support may vary.
Incorrect Answers
D:“Assume any RADIUS Access-Accept forces a requested dynamic VLAN on every Junos switch variant” does not address authentication success and postauthentication VLAN/policy assignment are separate stages whose feature support may vary.
E:“Add a static DNS record and assume it substitutes for captive-portal authentication and authorization” is an unsafe response to a different problem: guest users on an EX switch see no captive login page because browser HTTP redirects are not being applied on the intended VLAN. It is not a valid fix here.
F:“Mark every unknown MAC as trusted and give it unrestricted data-VLAN access” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an industrial sensor lacks a supplicant but needs restricted network authorization through a centralized identity service. It is not a valid fix here.
Question 833
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? A forwarding-class configuration sends critical routing packets to a queue used for bulk backups and adjacency stability degrades under load.
- Test ingress classification separately from egress rewrite at every trust boundary.
- Review queue buffer tradeoffs and regression-test peak loads before tuning schedulers.
- Test both average-rate enforcement and microburst tolerance for new policer profiles.
- Keep a documented forwarding-class inventory and test default mappings after service changes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Keep a documented forwarding-class inventory and test default mappings after service changes. This guards against forwarding classes select output queues; an incorrect class-to-queue association can cause head-of-line delays.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Test ingress classification separately from egress rewrite at every trust boundary” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a boundary router classifies EF voice traffic correctly but sends outbound DSCP zero, so downstream devices undo priority handling. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Review queue buffer tradeoffs and regression-test peak loads before tuning schedulers” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: video gets dropped under congestion despite spare capacity because its queue has a too-small delay buffer. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Test both average-rate enforcement and microburst tolerance for new policer profiles” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a traffic policer drops small microbursts despite an acceptable average rate because its configured burst size is too tight. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 834
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? An OSPF export term filters routes based on the wrong protocol, so an intended static default is not originated.
- Include a checklist of advertised IPv6 service and loopback addresses in OSPFv3 acceptance.
- Validate active logical-interface mappings and IPv6 adjacency as part of change acceptance.
- Verify both protocol RIB candidates and active next-hop selection in dual-stack change tests.
- Add a catch-all accept at the end of the policy to bypass the source-type error.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The tempting alternative fails because routing-policy match criteria must align with the source route type and the intended OSPF export behavior. The supported action is to inspect the active local default and export term conditions; match only the authorized static default source.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to OSPFv3 peering comes up but the desired IPv6 loopback is not in the routing database after a rollout.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
B:That prevention measure relates to an IPv6-only branch has OSPFv3 Hellos on the wrong logical unit after interface renumbering, so no IPv6 routes appear.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
C:That prevention measure relates to an IPv6 route learned through OSPFv3 is absent from the forwarding table because a more preferred static route covers the same prefix.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Question 835
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A boundary router classifies EF voice traffic correctly but sends outbound DSCP zero, so downstream devices undo priority handling. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Apply an approved behavior-aggregate classifier with the intended DSCP-to-class mapping on the real ingress interface.
- Map the two packet categories to the intended PLP levels and verify drop-profile response.
- Apply the appropriate interface rewrite rule and verify the contract-specific egress code points.
- Review the forwarding class and queue map for control and data traffic and apply the intended assignments.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Junos egress rewrite rules map internal forwarding class and PLP back into supported packet header markings. Verify this by checking that packet captures show the intended DSCP or 802.1p fields on outbound voice, video and data traffic.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Apply an approved behavior-aggregate classifier with the intended DSCP-to-class mapping on the real ingress interface” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a campus uplink transmits marked video as ordinary data because no behavior-aggregate classifier is attached at ingress. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Map the two packet categories to the intended PLP levels and verify drop-profile response” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a business wants out-of-profile marked traffic to drop earlier than in-profile traffic within one forwarding class. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Review the forwarding class and queue map for control and data traffic and apply the intended assignments” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a forwarding-class configuration sends critical routing packets to a queue used for bulk backups and adjacency stability degrades under load. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 836
For this case, select TWO complementary measures or outcome checks that directly resolve the problem: A fabric advertises Type 3 routes and claims this proves specific remote host MACs are reachable.
- The expected MAC/IP binding is visible in Type 2 while multihoming and BUM state use their own route types.
- Assume an Ethernet payload that fits a non-VXLAN path always fits once the VXLAN overhead is added.
- Reuse one VNI for unrelated tenants and assume local VLAN names alone prevent overlay mixing.
- Read a Type 1 Ethernet auto-discovery update as the definitive source of every individual host MAC address.
- Inspect the route type appropriate to the claimed control-plane information instead of treating all EVPN NLRIs equally.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:The expected MAC/IP binding is visible in Type 2 while multihoming and BUM state use their own route types. The specific steps required are to inspect the route type appropriate to the claimed control-plane information instead of treating all EVPN NLRIs equally.
E:Inspect the route type appropriate to the claimed control-plane information instead of treating all EVPN NLRIs equally. This addresses the dependency that EVPN route types carry different information: Type 1 Ethernet auto-discovery, Type 2 MAC/IP, Type 3 inclusive multicast.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Assume an Ethernet payload that fits a non-VXLAN path always fits once the VXLAN overhead is added” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an EVPN-VXLAN frame is dropped over a path where the IP underlay MTU was sized only for unencapsulated Ethernet payloads. It is not a valid fix here.
C:“Reuse one VNI for unrelated tenants and assume local VLAN names alone prevent overlay mixing” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a fabric uses conflicting VLAN-to-VNI mappings on two leaf switches, bridging different tenant segments together. It is not a valid fix here.
D:“Read a Type 1 Ethernet auto-discovery update as the definitive source of every individual host MAC address” does not address EVPN route types carry different information: Type 1 Ethernet auto-discovery, Type 2 MAC/IP, Type 3 inclusive multicast.
Question 837
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? An industrial sensor lacks a supplicant but needs restricted network authorization through a centralized identity service.
- Classify interactive and headless endpoint requirements before choosing the access method.
- Track hardware, software edition and port family when standardizing access policies.
- Review MAC-device inventory, spoofing exposure and expiry before using MAC-based authorization.
- Document and test EAP timeout, explicit rejection and server-unavailable cases separately.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Review MAC-device inventory, spoofing exposure and expiry before using MAC-based authorization. This guards against MAC RADIUS provides a fallback identity mechanism for suitable non-802.1X devices, with weaker assurance than certificate-based 802.1X.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Classify interactive and headless endpoint requirements before choosing the access method” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a noninteractive sensor is trapped in captive-portal onboarding because operators selected browser authentication for all endpoints. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Track hardware, software edition and port family when standardizing access policies” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: an access switch is moved to Junos OS Evolved but the team assumes every earlier guest-VLAN feature still exists on L2 802.1X interfaces. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Document and test EAP timeout, explicit rejection and server-unavailable cases separately” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a credential-rejected user is sent to the guest VLAN even though the planned design reserves guest VLAN for silent non-supplicants. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 838
A network change is required for the following specific situation: An emergency intercom can establish Ethernet link but loses power during activity because its PD class is not supported by that port. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Inspect PoE class, per-port priority and available chassis budget, and move to a supported powered port if needed.
- Configure an approved voice VLAN on the port while keeping the PC data VLAN constrained.
- Verify ingress voice classification, LLDP-MED policy and egress rewrite treatment for voice media.
- Update the approved location mapping and confirm transmitted LLDP-MED location information on the affected port.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Physical PoE delivery and negotiated device power requirements must match switch and endpoint capabilities. Verify this by checking that the device stays powered during peak consumption and Junos reports no power-denial events.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Configure an approved voice VLAN on the port while keeping the PC data VLAN constrained” belongs to a separate IP Telephony Features issue: a phone-with-PC desk deployment lets the PC reach data services while the tagged voice stream is dropped by VLAN membership. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Verify ingress voice classification, LLDP-MED policy and egress rewrite treatment for voice media” belongs to a separate IP Telephony Features issue: a voice VLAN is configured correctly yet the switch's trust and rewrite policy fails to preserve the required phone traffic classification. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Update the approved location mapping and confirm transmitted LLDP-MED location information on the affected port” belongs to a separate IP Telephony Features issue: an IP phone uses the wrong location information for emergency response after a switch move. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 839
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A shared multiaccess segment elects an undesired OSPF DR after new routers are connected, and control-plane load rises. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Review external metric type and value at the originator, then apply the documented traffic-engineering policy.
- Compare LSDB advertisements with local route policy and inet.0 state; correct the intended import filter.
- Inspect network type, interface priority and existing election state, then plan a controlled DR/BDR change.
- Inspect IPv6 interface addresses and OSPFv3 interface participation, then add the intended loopback advertisement within policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:DR/BDR elections on OSPF broadcast networks affect LSA exchange and can be influenced by priority. Verify this by checking that neighbor states and DR/BDR assignments match the approved design following a managed election.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Review external metric type and value at the originator, then apply the documented traffic-engineering policy” belongs to a separate Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) issue: a branch receives two external paths with different metric-type assumptions after a policy change and prefers the wrong exit. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Compare LSDB advertisements with local route policy and inet.0 state; correct the intended import filter” belongs to a separate Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) issue: an OSPF import policy hides external routes on one device while neighbors retain them, confusing the team reviewing reachability. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Inspect IPv6 interface addresses and OSPFv3 interface participation, then add the intended loopback advertisement within policy” belongs to a separate Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) issue: OSPFv3 peering comes up but the desired IPv6 loopback is not in the routing database after a rollout. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 840
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? A remote prefix appears in incoming BGP updates yet never becomes active after a new route policy was applied.
- Include show route hidden and policy term hit checks in BGP troubleshooting playbooks.
- Validate all required BGP address families during dual-stack peer commissioning.
- Include next-hop reachability tests in iBGP and route-reflector deployment acceptance.
- Validate every route-reflector client and failover path in topology inventory before conversion.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Include show route hidden and policy term hit checks in BGP troubleshooting playbooks. This guards against a BGP route rejected or hidden by import policy can be absent from active forwarding despite a healthy peer session.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Validate all required BGP address families during dual-stack peer commissioning” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: BGP peers exchange IPv4 NLRI correctly but a planned IPv6 customer route never appears in inet6.0. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Include next-hop reachability tests in iBGP and route-reflector deployment acceptance” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a new IPv4 BGP prefix has a valid AS path but cannot become active after the IGP stops carrying its next-hop address. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Validate every route-reflector client and failover path in topology inventory before conversion” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a route-reflector topology loses an iBGP-advertised prefix because clients are not configured under the intended reflector cluster. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests