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Question 1070
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A redundant network changes the preferred route to the source while packets keep arriving on the other physical link. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Select an appropriate SSM group range and verify source-specific IGMPv3/PIM signaling on the supported platform.
- Compare source-route preference with actual multicast ingress and restore a consistent authorized upstream path.
- Configure group-aware multicast routing policy and boundary filters at intended exits, then verify forwarding.
- Verify anycast RP address and supported source synchronization method across the participating RP nodes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:An RPF check is tied to the selected source path, so asymmetric arrival can invalidate otherwise reachable multicast traffic. Verify this by checking that RPF counters and expected (S,G) forwarding stabilize after the route change.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Select an appropriate SSM group range and verify source-specific IGMPv3/PIM signaling on the supported platform” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a video source is known and receivers support IGMPv3, but engineers configure ASM and an RP unnecessarily for the source-specific application. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Configure group-aware multicast routing policy and boundary filters at intended exits, then verify forwarding” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a financial multicast feed intended for one campus crosses the WAN because no boundary controls are configured. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Verify anycast RP address and supported source synchronization method across the participating RP nodes” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: an Anycast RP design uses two RP addresses that do not share the intended anycast identity, producing inconsistent joins. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 1071
For this case, select TWO complementary measures or outcome checks that directly resolve the problem: A campus multicast application migrates ASM clients to SSM but does not update the source-qualified membership requests.
- Treat SSM group membership as source-agnostic and subscribe to the group without source information.
- Disable IGMP snooping everywhere and assume uncontrolled flooding is equivalent to correct membership delivery.
- Only the specified source delivers data to receivers of the chosen SSM group.
- Require multicast forwarding to follow the receiver's shortest downstream path with no regard to source RPF.
- Update receiver memberships to use the approved source and group, and validate end-to-end (S,G) trees.
Explanation
Correct Answers
C:Only the specified source delivers data to receivers of the chosen SSM group. The specific steps required are to update receiver memberships to use the approved source and group, and validate end-to-end (S,G) trees.
E:Update receiver memberships to use the approved source and group, and validate end-to-end (S,G) trees. This addresses the dependency that ASM and SSM use different membership and source-selection semantics; an SSM receiver must identify its desired sender.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Treat SSM group membership as source-agnostic and subscribe to the group without source information” does not address ASM and SSM use different membership and source-selection semantics; an SSM receiver must identify its desired sender.
B:“Disable IGMP snooping everywhere and assume uncontrolled flooding is equivalent to correct membership delivery” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a receiver port stops getting multicast because IGMP membership was not processed by the access switch after an interface move. It is not a valid fix here.
D:“Require multicast forwarding to follow the receiver's shortest downstream path with no regard to source RPF” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a redundant network changes the preferred route to the source while packets keep arriving on the other physical link. It is not a valid fix here.
Question 1072
A network change is required for the following specific situation: An eBGP import policy unexpectedly accepts more-specific prefixes outside the approved customer allocation. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Use precise route-filter match conditions and explicit rejection of unauthorized more-specific routes.
- Restore permitted next-hop reachability via IGP or adjust next-hop policy where appropriate; recheck route detail.
- Verify endpoint reachability and configure appropriate multihop session parameters and security controls.
- Check IPv6 next-hop reachability and inet6.0, then install a permitted IPv6 underlay route or correct next-hop policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:BGP route filters must specify permitted exact or range-based prefix matching semantics deliberately. Verify this by checking that allowed customer prefixes are received while unauthorized longer prefixes are absent from accepted routes.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Restore permitted next-hop reachability via IGP or adjust next-hop policy where appropriate; recheck route detail” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a new IPv4 BGP prefix has a valid AS path but cannot become active after the IGP stops carrying its next-hop address. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Verify endpoint reachability and configure appropriate multihop session parameters and security controls” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a transit peering is moved off directly connected interface IPs to loopbacks yet the TTL and reachability design are not updated. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Check IPv6 next-hop reachability and inet6.0, then install a permitted IPv6 underlay route or correct next-hop policy” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an IPv6 BGP peer receives a route with an unreachable IPv6 next hop despite an otherwise valid inet6 unicast advertisement. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 1073
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A campus router's BGP IPv6 session is Established yet peers advertise only inet unicast family routes. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Check IPv6 next-hop reachability and inet6.0, then install a permitted IPv6 underlay route or correct next-hop policy.
- Select a permitted inbound traffic-engineering mechanism with the provider, such as suitable AS-path prepending or agreed communities.
- Enable the intended inet6 family consistently on eligible BGP peers and verify route policy and inet6.0.
- Inspect per-route local preferences and import policy; set the intended exit's LOCAL_PREF consistently.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:BGP address-family negotiation controls which IPv4 or IPv6 NLRI can be exchanged independently of session state. Verify this by checking that the expected IPv6 prefix is received in inet6.0 while IPv4 route exchange remains unchanged.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Check IPv6 next-hop reachability and inet6.0, then install a permitted IPv6 underlay route or correct next-hop policy” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an IPv6 BGP peer receives a route with an unreachable IPv6 next hop despite an otherwise valid inet6 unicast advertisement. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Select a permitted inbound traffic-engineering mechanism with the provider, such as suitable AS-path prepending or agreed communities” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a dual-homed site changes internal LOCAL_PREF but sees no change in the other autonomous system's inbound traffic choice. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Inspect per-route local preferences and import policy; set the intended exit's LOCAL_PREF consistently” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: two iBGP exits offer equal reachable routes but the one with higher LOCAL_PREF is not the egress an operator expected. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 1074
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? A Q-in-Q service works across transport but the far-end access handoff presents unexpected double tags.
- Test each critical VLAN's root bridge and forwarding path after VSTP updates.
- Test private-port isolation and uplink reachability after access topology changes.
- Include packet-capture verification of S-tag and C-tag transformation in provider handoffs.
- Document primary/secondary VLAN mappings and test permitted peer groups and isolation boundaries.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Include packet-capture verification of S-tag and C-tag transformation in provider handoffs. This guards against Q-in-Q requires deliberate tagging and untagging at service boundaries, with customer tags retained according to the handoff contract.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Test each critical VLAN's root bridge and forwarding path after VSTP updates” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a legacy interop design needs separate per-VLAN spanning-tree compatibility but all VLANs inherit one unsuitable tree. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Test private-port isolation and uplink reachability after access topology changes” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a lab uses one primary VLAN for many tenants but isolated access ports can still exchange Layer 2 frames after a misconfiguration. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Document primary/secondary VLAN mappings and test permitted peer groups and isolation boundaries” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a switch rollout splits a team that should communicate within one PVLAN community, while protecting it from another community. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 1075
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? After a RADIUS outage, the access switch opens ports broadly instead of applying the approved restricted server-fail VLAN.
- Verify RADIUS attribute handling and model/release feature support before rolling out dynamic assignment.
- Review authorization policies for MAC endpoints against a least-privilege access matrix.
- Include downstream device count and authentication method in desk-port templates.
- Configure unrestricted access as the universal RADIUS-outage fallback for sensitive access ports.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The tempting alternative fails because server-fail fallback must be an explicitly scoped authorization policy; availability cannot justify unbounded access. The supported action is to use a supported restricted server-fail policy and validate failure handling on the specific Junos platform.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to a switch receives successful RADIUS Access-Accept but the user still lands in an unexpected VLAN because the dynamic assignment is not supported on that platform.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
B:That prevention measure relates to a legacy printer can join after MAC authentication yet is allowed to reach sensitive management segments.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
C:That prevention measure relates to a telephony desk requires multiple authenticated identities while the switch policy allows only one active supplicant.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Question 1076
A Junos enterprise team investigates this incident: A VXLAN overlay's BGP EVPN routes are present, but the underlay cannot route to a remote VTEP loopback. Which technical explanation most directly identifies the cause or design principle?
- EVPN route types carry different information: Type 1 Ethernet auto-discovery, Type 2 MAC/IP, Type 3 inclusive multicast.
- EVPN Type 3 inclusive multicast routes announce interested VTEPs for a broadcast domain's BUM replication set.
- VXLAN encapsulates overlay traffic across an IP underlay; VTEP reachability is necessary even with valid BGP EVPN control-plane state.
- EVPN multihoming uses Ethernet segment identification and designated-forwarder or split-horizon rules to avoid loops.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:VXLAN encapsulates overlay traffic across an IP underlay; VTEP reachability is necessary even with valid BGP EVPN control-plane state. The appropriate response is to repair authorized underlay routing to remote VTEPs and check tunnel reachability before changing EVPN policies.
Incorrect Answers
A:“EVPN route types carry different information: Type 1 Ethernet auto-discovery, Type 2 MAC/IP, Type 3 inclusive multicast” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: a troubleshooting team expects EVPN Ethernet auto-discovery route Type 1 to carry all host MAC/IP bindings. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“EVPN Type 3 inclusive multicast routes announce interested VTEPs for a broadcast domain's BUM replication set” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: a bridge domain has valid unicast Type 2 entries yet remote VTEPs do not discover a new participating segment for BUM forwarding. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“EVPN multihoming uses Ethernet segment identification and designated-forwarder or split-horizon rules to avoid loops” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: a dual-attached Ethernet segment experiences persistent duplicates during link recovery because multihoming election or ESI state differs. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 1077
For this case, select TWO complementary measures or outcome checks that directly resolve the problem: An eBGP import policy unexpectedly accepts more-specific prefixes outside the approved customer allocation.
- Use MED changes alone as guaranteed overrides of a conflicting higher local preference.
- Use precise route-filter match conditions and explicit rejection of unauthorized more-specific routes.
- Accept every prefix inside the aggregate without evaluating the agreed maximum prefix length.
- Expect a locally set LOCAL_PREF value to propagate unchanged over standard eBGP to another AS.
- Allowed customer prefixes are received while unauthorized longer prefixes are absent from accepted routes.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Use precise route-filter match conditions and explicit rejection of unauthorized more-specific routes. This addresses the dependency that BGP route filters must specify permitted exact or range-based prefix matching semantics deliberately.
E:Allowed customer prefixes are received while unauthorized longer prefixes are absent from accepted routes. The specific steps required are to use precise route-filter match conditions and explicit rejection of unauthorized more-specific routes.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Use MED changes alone as guaranteed overrides of a conflicting higher local preference” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an enterprise chooses a different BGP exit after import policy assigns a higher local preference to the backup path. It is not a valid fix here.
C:“Accept every prefix inside the aggregate without evaluating the agreed maximum prefix length” does not address BGP route filters must specify permitted exact or range-based prefix matching semantics deliberately.
D:“Expect a locally set LOCAL_PREF value to propagate unchanged over standard eBGP to another AS” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a dual-homed site changes internal LOCAL_PREF but sees no change in the other autonomous system's inbound traffic choice. It is not a valid fix here.
Question 1078
Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: An access-area adjacency drops after one device is changed to shorter OSPF Hello timers but its peer keeps prior settings.
- Keep timer settings in shared configuration templates and validate both directions before rollout.
- Add a catch-all accept at the end of the policy to bypass the source-type error.
- Stable Hellos and Full neighbor state persist through repeated protocol interval checks.
- Change only BGP keepalive values and assume OSPF timers automatically follow.
- Configure IPv4 OSPFv2 alone and expect it to populate IPv6 unicast routes automatically.
- Compare OSPF interface timers and align the two peers to approved Hello and dead values.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Prevention of recurrence: OSPF neighbors require compatible Hello and dead interval settings on the shared interface.
C:Confirmation: Compare OSPF interface timers and align the two peers to approved Hello and dead values.
F:Correction: OSPF neighbors require compatible Hello and dead interval settings on the shared interface.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Add a catch-all accept at the end of the policy to bypass the source-type error” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an OSPF export term filters routes based on the wrong protocol, so an intended static default is not originated. It is not a valid fix here.
D:“Change only BGP keepalive values and assume OSPF timers automatically follow” does not address OSPF neighbors require compatible Hello and dead interval settings on the shared interface.
E:“Configure IPv4 OSPFv2 alone and expect it to populate IPv6 unicast routes automatically” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a new IPv6 peering uses OSPFv3 on a retired VLAN unit rather than the active routed transit interface. It is not a valid fix here.
Question 1079
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? An ingress classification filter for one terminal type inadvertently redirects other hosts using the same uplink.
- Keep explicit root priority policy and validate elections after device replacement.
- Include MVRP adjacency and registration checks in trunk-change reviews.
- Use a catch-all quarantine match without analyzing which hosts also traverse the interface.
- Track MSTP instance scale and maintain identical region parameters across participating switches.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The tempting alternative fails because overbroad match conditions can cause unauthorized VLAN steering and affect both security and reachability. The supported action is to narrow the match to approved selectors and compare affected packet counters and VLAN assignment.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to a switch with an unexpectedly low bridge priority becomes MSTP root and redirects aggregation traffic through an access closet.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
B:That prevention measure relates to a new switch automatically discovers VLAN registrations on one trunk, but an intermediate trunk lacks MVRP participation and blocks the VLAN.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
D:That prevention measure relates to a network uses one VLAN-wide topology but wants two forwarding trees for different groups without an instance for every VLAN.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Question 1080
Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: A Q-in-Q service works across transport but the far-end access handoff presents unexpected double tags.
- A packet capture shows the contracted customer tag or untagged frame at the endpoint.
- Treat ordinary VLAN membership as equivalent to isolation between every port inside that VLAN.
- Assume setting one global RSTP root automatically produces independently chosen roots for every VSTP VLAN.
- Include packet-capture verification of S-tag and C-tag transformation in provider handoffs.
- Assume every endpoint supports stacked 802.1Q tags even when the customer ordered a single-tagged handoff.
- Inspect the ingress/egress tag-processing configuration and correct the service handoff encapsulation.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Confirmation: Inspect the ingress/egress tag-processing configuration and correct the service handoff encapsulation.
D:Prevention of recurrence: Q-in-Q requires deliberate tagging and untagging at service boundaries, with customer tags retained according to the handoff contract.
F:Correction: Q-in-Q requires deliberate tagging and untagging at service boundaries, with customer tags retained according to the handoff contract.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Treat ordinary VLAN membership as equivalent to isolation between every port inside that VLAN” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a shared guest access VLAN allows two untrusted hotel-room ports to communicate directly, violating the isolation design. It is not a valid fix here.
C:“Assume setting one global RSTP root automatically produces independently chosen roots for every VSTP VLAN” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a legacy interop design needs separate per-VLAN spanning-tree compatibility but all VLANs inherit one unsuitable tree. It is not a valid fix here.
E:“Assume every endpoint supports stacked 802.1Q tags even when the customer ordered a single-tagged handoff” does not address Q-in-Q requires deliberate tagging and untagging at service boundaries, with customer tags retained according to the handoff contract.
Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests