Juniper JN0-650 Exam Dumps, Practice Test Questions

100% Latest & Updated Juniper JN0-650 Practice Test Questions, Exam Dumps & Verified Answers!
30 Days Free Updates, Instant Download!

Juniper JN0-650  Premium File
$54.99
$49.99

JN0-650 Premium File

  • Premium File: 107 Questions & Answers. Last update: Nov 7, 2026
  • Latest Questions
  • 100% Accurate Answers
  • Fast Exam Updates

JN0-650 Premium File

Juniper JN0-650  Premium File
  • Premium File: 107 Questions & Answers. Last update: Nov 7, 2026
  • Latest Questions
  • 100% Accurate Answers
  • Fast Exam Updates
$54.99
$49.99

Juniper JN0-650 Practice Test 21

Question 200

A Junos enterprise team investigates this incident: A Junos route is hidden by import policy, but the team troubleshoots only local physical interfaces. Which technical explanation most directly identifies the cause or design principle?

  1. A BGP route rejected or hidden by import policy can be absent from active forwarding despite a healthy peer session.
  2. MED has lower precedence than LOCAL_PREF and AS-path in common BGP best-path selection and must be compared under supported conditions.
  3. Multihop BGP peerings require suitable routing to endpoint addresses and peer-session settings for nonadjacent endpoints.
  4. LOCAL_PREF is an intra-AS BGP attribute, not a value routinely advertised to external BGP neighbors.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A BGP route rejected or hidden by import policy can be absent from active forwarding despite a healthy peer session. The appropriate response is to inspect hidden-route reason, incoming attributes and import-policy decisions, then correct the authorized match.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“MED has lower precedence than LOCAL_PREF and AS-path in common BGP best-path selection and must be compared under supported conditions” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: two equal LOCAL_PREF and AS-path candidates remain tied until MED influences the choice under the applicable comparison rules. It does not explain the condition tested here.

C:

“Multihop BGP peerings require suitable routing to endpoint addresses and peer-session settings for nonadjacent endpoints” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a multihop eBGP peer uses loopback addresses but its session times out when directly connected assumptions remain. It does not explain the condition tested here.

D:

“LOCAL_PREF is an intra-AS BGP attribute, not a value routinely advertised to external BGP neighbors” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an operator tries to make a remote AS prefer one inbound path using LOCAL_PREF that the remote eBGP peer never receives. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Question 201

Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? A MAC RADIUS device changes its network adapter and can no longer authenticate because its registered identifier is stale.

  1. Include downstream device count and authentication method in desk-port templates.
  2. Treat a MAC address alone as cryptographic proof of device ownership and elevate access privileges.
  3. Classify interactive and headless endpoint requirements before choosing the access method.
  4. Document and test EAP timeout, explicit rejection and server-unavailable cases separately.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The tempting alternative fails because MAC-based identity is tied to the observed hardware address and can be spoofed; it is not strong user authentication. The supported action is to confirm the actual device and approved MAC record, then restrict the resulting authorization and add compensating controls.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That prevention measure relates to an access port is placed in single-supplicant mode but a desk phone and PC must authenticate separately behind the same port.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.

C:

That prevention measure relates to a captive portal requirement is applied to a headless barcode scanner that has no web browser to follow its redirect.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.

D:

That prevention measure relates to a credential-rejected user is sent to the guest VLAN even though the planned design reserves guest VLAN for silent non-supplicants.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.

Question 202

Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? Two iBGP exits offer equal reachable routes but the one with higher LOCAL_PREF is not the egress an operator expected.

  1. Use MED changes alone as guaranteed overrides of a conflicting higher local preference.
  2. Review fall-through behavior with traceable policy test cases before changes reach production.
  3. Review policy ordering with negative tests and explicit default actions on every change.
  4. Track every BGP advertise-inactive exception and test cross-protocol route selection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The tempting alternative fails because BGP typically prefers a larger LOCAL_PREF among otherwise eligible candidates before later path-selection tie breakers. The supported action is to inspect per-route local preferences and import policy; set the intended exit's LOCAL_PREF consistently.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That prevention measure relates to a route policy lacks an explicit intended default action, and unmatched BGP prefixes behave differently than planned.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.

C:

That prevention measure relates to a route with a permissive policy term is accepted before a later deny term can block it.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.

D:

That prevention measure relates to an engineer adds advertise-inactive and downstream peers begin receiving a BGP route that loses to an OSPF route locally.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.

Question 203

The team believes it has resolved this Junos issue: A multicast source is active in a different PIM domain but the local ASM RP never learns the source mapping. Which observation best verifies the specific intended result?

  1. Restricted groups are stopped at the boundary while approved collaboration streams still reach subscribers.
  2. Remote ASM receivers can discover the intended source and request multicast delivery through the proper tree.
  3. RPF counters and expected (S,G) forwarding stabilize after the route change.
  4. Receivers subscribed to the intended (S,G) get traffic while nonselected sources cannot join that flow.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Remote ASM receivers can discover the intended source and request multicast delivery through the proper tree. This checks the relevant result after inspect MSDP peer state and source-active information, then configure the permitted peer relationships.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Restricted groups are stopped at the boundary while approved collaboration streams still reach subscribers” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: an edge router uses a broad multicast filter that blocks valid collaboration groups alongside restricted lab streams. It does not explain the condition tested here.

C:

“RPF counters and expected (S,G) forwarding stabilize after the route change” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a stream uses asymmetric unicast routing; multicast forwarding fails intermittently although individual host routes work. It does not explain the condition tested here.

D:

“Receivers subscribed to the intended (S,G) get traffic while nonselected sources cannot join that flow” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a video source is known and receivers support IGMPv3, but engineers configure ASM and an RP unnecessarily for the source-specific application. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Question 204

The team believes it has resolved this Junos issue: A printer's MAC address is duplicated by an unauthorized endpoint that obtains the same weak MAC-based policy. Which observation best verifies the specific intended result?

  1. Only the inventoried device has the expected limited connectivity; rogue or unknown hardware is denied.
  2. Validation shows only supported options in use and the intended access-denial/fallback behavior.
  3. The observed authentication state identifies missing supplicant response, and the approved method onboards the endpoint.
  4. The scanner authenticates through the approved method without any browser step, while unknown devices stay denied.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Only the inventoried device has the expected limited connectivity; rogue or unknown hardware is denied. This checks the relevant result after confirm the actual device and approved MAC record, then restrict the resulting authorization and add compensating controls.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Validation shows only supported options in use and the intended access-denial/fallback behavior” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: an access switch is moved to Junos OS Evolved but the team assumes every earlier guest-VLAN feature still exists on L2 802.1X interfaces. It does not explain the condition tested here.

C:

“The observed authentication state identifies missing supplicant response, and the approved method onboards the endpoint” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a RADIUS server reports no Access-Request for a silent legacy terminal, while switch timers show no EAP response. It does not explain the condition tested here.

D:

“The scanner authenticates through the approved method without any browser step, while unknown devices stay denied” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a captive portal requirement is applied to a headless barcode scanner that has no web browser to follow its redirect. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Question 205

A network change is required for the following specific situation: A campus access interface keeps a compliant supplicant blocked while EAP requests never reach the expected authentication backend. Which corrective action is most appropriate?

  1. Configure supported MAC RADIUS under least-privilege policy and register the device MAC with the approved service.
  2. Inspect switch authenticator state and RADIUS reachability and identity settings, then repair the approved server configuration.
  3. Use a supported restricted server-fail policy and validate failure handling on the specific Junos platform.
  4. Assign the authenticated device to the authorized restricted network profile and verify effective VLAN/filter.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

802.1X authorization depends on the authenticator, supplicant and authentication-server conversation being correctly connected. Verify this by checking that a known-good supplicant completes EAP/RADIUS authentication and the port reaches its intended authorized state.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Configure supported MAC RADIUS under least-privilege policy and register the device MAC with the approved service” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: an industrial sensor lacks a supplicant but needs restricted network authorization through a centralized identity service. It does not explain the condition tested here.

C:

“Use a supported restricted server-fail policy and validate failure handling on the specific Junos platform” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: an enterprise fallback design accidentally places unauthenticated users into the production network when all RADIUS servers fail. It does not explain the condition tested here.

D:

“Assign the authenticated device to the authorized restricted network profile and verify effective VLAN/filter” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a MAC RADIUS policy authenticates a known camera but applies the broad employee VLAN instead of a camera-only network. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Question 206

Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: A full-mesh iBGP design is converted to route reflection but one peer is treated as an ordinary nonclient and route propagation fails.

  1. Disable all iBGP loop protection and expect the route-reflector hierarchy to be unnecessary.
  2. Expect a locally set LOCAL_PREF value to propagate unchanged over standard eBGP to another AS.
  3. Inspect reflector/client relationships and cluster behavior, then correct the intended route-reflector configuration.
  4. The downstream client learns approved prefixes and cluster-loop checks remain operational.
  5. Validate every route-reflector client and failover path in topology inventory before conversion.
  6. Assume TCP session Established proves every learned prefix has a usable forwarding next hop.

Explanation

Correct Answers

C:

Correction: iBGP-learned routes are not freely re-advertised to all iBGP neighbors without appropriate reflection or topology.

D:

Confirmation: Inspect reflector/client relationships and cluster behavior, then correct the intended route-reflector configuration.

E:

Prevention of recurrence: iBGP-learned routes are not freely re-advertised to all iBGP neighbors without appropriate reflection or topology.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Disable all iBGP loop protection and expect the route-reflector hierarchy to be unnecessary” does not address iBGP-learned routes are not freely re-advertised to all iBGP neighbors without appropriate reflection or topology.

B:

“Expect a locally set LOCAL_PREF value to propagate unchanged over standard eBGP to another AS” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an operator tries to make a remote AS prefer one inbound path using LOCAL_PREF that the remote eBGP peer never receives. It is not a valid fix here.

F:

“Assume TCP session Established proves every learned prefix has a usable forwarding next hop” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an iBGP egress advertisement forwards a transit next hop that branch routers cannot resolve, creating traffic blackholes. It is not a valid fix here.

Question 207

To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? A new switch automatically discovers VLAN registrations on one trunk, but an intermediate trunk lacks MVRP participation and blocks the VLAN.

  1. Version-control MSTP name, revision and VLAN mapping as one change unit.
  2. Include MVRP adjacency and registration checks in trunk-change reviews.
  3. Test each critical VLAN's root bridge and forwarding path after VSTP updates.
  4. Test gateway and approved shared-service access alongside lateral isolation in PVLAN reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Include MVRP adjacency and registration checks in trunk-change reviews. This guards against MVRP distributes VLAN registration information across participating links; a gap can stop propagation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Version-control MSTP name, revision and VLAN mapping as one change unit” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: two adjacent MSTP switches show different region digests after one has a different VLAN-to-instance map. It does not explain the condition tested here.

C:

“Test each critical VLAN's root bridge and forwarding path after VSTP updates” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a VSTP network intended to send voice and data VLANs over different active paths instead blocks both on the same uplink. It does not explain the condition tested here.

D:

“Test gateway and approved shared-service access alongside lateral isolation in PVLAN reviews” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a private VLAN isolated endpoint reaches the local gateway but cannot access a peer service that should be shared via a permitted promiscuous port. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Question 208

The team believes it has resolved this Junos issue: A prefix-list matches a broad aggregate but accepts unwanted subprefixes from a new external neighbor. Which observation best verifies the specific intended result?

  1. The routing and forwarding tables show the intended multiple next hops only for qualifying routes.
  2. A controlled route is withheld from prohibited peers while approved routes retain their expected advertisements.
  3. Allowed customer prefixes are received while unauthorized longer prefixes are absent from accepted routes.
  4. The IPv6 BGP route becomes eligible and forwards over an IPv6-resolvable next hop.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Allowed customer prefixes are received while unauthorized longer prefixes are absent from accepted routes. This checks the relevant result after use precise route-filter match conditions and explicit rejection of unauthorized more-specific routes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“The routing and forwarding tables show the intended multiple next hops only for qualifying routes” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: two eBGP sessions over different transports are expected to provide ECMP but only one forwarding next hop appears. It does not explain the condition tested here.

B:

“A controlled route is withheld from prohibited peers while approved routes retain their expected advertisements” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a provider-facing policy stops honoring a route-tag community after a new import policy changes the attached communities. It does not explain the condition tested here.

D:

“The IPv6 BGP route becomes eligible and forwards over an IPv6-resolvable next hop” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an IPv6 transit prefix is hidden because its next-hop address is absent from the correct IPv6 routing table. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Question 209

To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? Voice packets arrive with DSCP EF but are placed into the best-effort queue after a new access interface template is applied.

  1. Test classifier attachment and DSCP mappings on every access and aggregation ingress template.
  2. Keep queue drop-profile acceptance tests and monitor production congestion before broad rollout.
  3. Validate classifier, scheduler map and interface association as a complete CoS chain.
  4. Establish congestion thresholds and monitor starvation as part of queue-priority design.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Test classifier attachment and DSCP mappings on every access and aggregation ingress template. This guards against Junos ingress classifiers map packet header code points to forwarding classes and packet loss priority, subject to interface attachment.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Keep queue drop-profile acceptance tests and monitor production congestion before broad rollout” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a RED drop profile is applied too aggressively and drops packets even under moderate load. It does not explain the condition tested here.

C:

“Validate classifier, scheduler map and interface association as a complete CoS chain” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a campus has configured forwarding classes and schedulers but one uplink carries all traffic through default service because association is missing. It does not explain the condition tested here.

D:

“Establish congestion thresholds and monitor starvation as part of queue-priority design” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: two queues use the same scheduler priority, but the business expects one to always win during contention. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Question 210

The team believes it has resolved this Junos issue: A provider-facing policy stops honoring a route-tag community after a new import policy changes the attached communities. Which observation best verifies the specific intended result?

  1. The expected IPv6 prefix is received in inet6.0 while IPv4 route exchange remains unchanged.
  2. The previously hidden BGP prefix resolves its next hop and becomes an eligible route.
  3. The advertised set matches the documented inactive-BGP exception without changing local forwarding selection.
  4. A controlled route is withheld from prohibited peers while approved routes retain their expected advertisements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A controlled route is withheld from prohibited peers while approved routes retain their expected advertisements. This checks the relevant result after inspect received communities and export policy terms, then attach a tested community match and reject rule.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“The expected IPv6 prefix is received in inet6.0 while IPv4 route exchange remains unchanged” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: BGP peers exchange IPv4 NLRI correctly but a planned IPv6 customer route never appears in inet6.0. It does not explain the condition tested here.

B:

“The previously hidden BGP prefix resolves its next hop and becomes an eligible route” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a new IPv4 BGP prefix has a valid AS path but cannot become active after the IGP stops carrying its next-hop address. It does not explain the condition tested here.

C:

“The advertised set matches the documented inactive-BGP exception without changing local forwarding selection” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an engineer adds advertise-inactive and downstream peers begin receiving a BGP route that loses to an OSPF route locally. It does not explain the condition tested here.

Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests

UP

SPECIAL OFFER: GET 10% OFF

This is ONE TIME OFFER

ExamSnap Discount Offer
Enter Your Email Address to Receive Your 10% Off Discount Code

A confirmation link will be sent to this email address to verify your login. *We value your privacy. We will not rent or sell your email address.

Download Free Demo of VCE Exam Simulator

Experience Avanset VCE Exam Simulator for yourself.

Simply submit your e-mail address below to get started with our interactive software demo of your free trial.

Free Demo Limits: In the demo version you will be able to access only first 5 questions from exam.