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Question 890
A Junos enterprise team investigates this incident: An ASM video distribution has valid listener memberships yet PIM joins never converge toward the configured RP. Which technical explanation most directly identifies the cause or design principle?
- Multicast administrative scoping must restrict eligible groups and outgoing boundaries; group addresses alone do not impose all policy.
- PIM sparse-mode ASM builds shared-tree state toward a reachable RP, and an incorrect RP mapping can prevent service.
- An RPF check is tied to the selected source path, so asymmetric arrival can invalidate otherwise reachable multicast traffic.
- ASM and SSM use different membership and source-selection semantics; an SSM receiver must identify its desired sender.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:PIM sparse-mode ASM builds shared-tree state toward a reachable RP, and an incorrect RP mapping can prevent service. The appropriate response is to check group-to-RP mapping and RP reachability, then repair the RP discovery or explicit mapping.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Multicast administrative scoping must restrict eligible groups and outgoing boundaries; group addresses alone do not impose all policy” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a laboratory's multicast test group leaks to the corporate backbone despite a requirement to keep it within the lab. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“An RPF check is tied to the selected source path, so asymmetric arrival can invalidate otherwise reachable multicast traffic” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a stream uses asymmetric unicast routing; multicast forwarding fails intermittently although individual host routes work. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“ASM and SSM use different membership and source-selection semantics; an SSM receiver must identify its desired sender” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a streaming application expects a source-specific group to accept traffic from any origin, contrary to its (S,G) subscription. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 891
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? A campus has configured forwarding classes and schedulers but one uplink carries all traffic through default service because association is missing.
- Plan buffer and shaping rates against provider handoff capacity and expected burst size.
- Validate classifier, scheduler map and interface association as a complete CoS chain.
- Test both average-rate enforcement and microburst tolerance for new policer profiles.
- Document trusted-marking boundaries and test both matched and unmatched multifield traffic.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Validate classifier, scheduler map and interface association as a complete CoS chain. This guards against egress scheduling requires the intended schedulers and their mapping to be applied on the outgoing interface.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Plan buffer and shaping rates against provider handoff capacity and expected burst size” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a branch link should pace scheduled traffic to a slower uplink yet the team only drops excess packets abruptly. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Test both average-rate enforcement and microburst tolerance for new policer profiles” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: an uplink meets long-term bandwidth policy but legitimate short bursts exceed the token-bucket allowance. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Document trusted-marking boundaries and test both matched and unmatched multifield traffic” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a security function needs to classify a subset of traffic by source and destination criteria rather than trusted external markings. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 892
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? Packets with two different drop precedence values are treated as equally discardable during congestion.
- Validate classifier, scheduler map and interface association as a complete CoS chain.
- Map every packet to the lowest loss priority regardless of its out-of-profile status.
- Review queue buffer tradeoffs and regression-test peak loads before tuning schedulers.
- Audit DSCP preservation and remarking at untrusted edge boundaries.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The tempting alternative fails because packet loss priority differentiates drop susceptibility within a forwarding class and works with the configured queue/drop behavior. The supported action is to map the two packet categories to the intended PLP levels and verify drop-profile response.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to a low-latency queue is correctly classified but voice delays because its egress scheduler map is absent from the trunk.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
C:That prevention measure relates to a backup traffic queue consumes too much buffer and latency-sensitive applications starve during peak bursts.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
D:That prevention measure relates to a customer access switch trusts external CoS bits and redistributes high-priority markings to all guest traffic.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Question 893
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A guest network should be rate-limited at ingress, but engineers configure only an egress shaper on the uplink. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Review the forwarding class and queue map for control and data traffic and apply the intended assignments.
- Apply the appropriate interface rewrite rule and verify the contract-specific egress code points.
- Apply a correctly scoped ingress policer with tested rate and burst values on the relevant flow.
- Apply an approved behavior-aggregate classifier with the intended DSCP-to-class mapping on the real ingress interface.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A policer enforces traffic rate or burst limits and can discard or mark out-of-profile input; shaping buffers traffic for paced egress. Verify this by checking that measured guest ingress usage remains within policy and permitted business traffic is unaffected.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Review the forwarding class and queue map for control and data traffic and apply the intended assignments” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a forwarding-class configuration sends critical routing packets to a queue used for bulk backups and adjacency stability degrades under load. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Apply the appropriate interface rewrite rule and verify the contract-specific egress code points” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: a boundary router classifies EF voice traffic correctly but sends outbound DSCP zero, so downstream devices undo priority handling. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Apply an approved behavior-aggregate classifier with the intended DSCP-to-class mapping on the real ingress interface” belongs to a separate Class of Service (CoS) issue: voice packets arrive with DSCP EF but are placed into the best-effort queue after a new access interface template is applied. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 894
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? The local AS appears in a received external BGP AS_PATH and the route is rejected despite valid prefix reachability.
- Include inet6-specific next-hop verification in dual-stack BGP peer checklists.
- Record eBGP peer transport depth and endpoint routing in deployment templates.
- Monitor AS-path anomalies and validate inter-AS topology changes before enabling export.
- Test path equivalence, forwarding and failure convergence before enabling transit ECMP.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Monitor AS-path anomalies and validate inter-AS topology changes before enabling export. This guards against the default BGP AS-path loop check rejects routes containing the local autonomous system to prevent loops.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Include inet6-specific next-hop verification in dual-stack BGP peer checklists” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an IPv6 transit prefix is hidden because its next-hop address is absent from the correct IPv6 routing table. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Record eBGP peer transport depth and endpoint routing in deployment templates” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a transit peering is moved off directly connected interface IPs to loopbacks yet the TTL and reachability design are not updated. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Test path equivalence, forwarding and failure convergence before enabling transit ECMP” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: two eBGP sessions over different transports are expected to provide ECMP but only one forwarding next hop appears. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 895
The team believes it has resolved this Junos issue: A captive portal requirement is applied to a headless barcode scanner that has no web browser to follow its redirect. Which observation best verifies the specific intended result?
- A nonresponding guest gets its intended limited VLAN while invalid credentials never receive guest privilege.
- The scanner authenticates through the approved method without any browser step, while unknown devices stay denied.
- Only the inventoried device has the expected limited connectivity; rogue or unknown hardware is denied.
- The registered device is authorized with limited access; an unknown MAC remains blocked.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The scanner authenticates through the approved method without any browser step, while unknown devices stay denied. This checks the relevant result after choose a documented compatible nonbrowser method such as supported MAC RADIUS under narrow access controls.
Incorrect Answers
A:“A nonresponding guest gets its intended limited VLAN while invalid credentials never receive guest privilege” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a credential-rejected user is sent to the guest VLAN even though the planned design reserves guest VLAN for silent non-supplicants. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Only the inventoried device has the expected limited connectivity; rogue or unknown hardware is denied” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a MAC RADIUS device changes its network adapter and can no longer authenticate because its registered identifier is stale. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“The registered device is authorized with limited access; an unknown MAC remains blocked” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a non-802.1X network printer is consistently rejected because its access port permits only EAP supplicants. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 896
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? A one-to-many lecture stream is configured as separate unicast connections and saturates a WAN link to a remote campus.
- Test multicast source-path behavior under each failover case, not only unicast ping.
- Monitor IGMP membership churn and snooping state when moving clients between VLANs.
- Keep an approved multicast group allocation and test boundary enforcement after routing changes.
- Measure receiver interest and multicast forwarding state before scaling new one-to-many services.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Measure receiver interest and multicast forwarding state before scaling new one-to-many services. This guards against IP multicast replicates streams at forwarding branches instead of requiring a separate source-to-receiver unicast stream.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Test multicast source-path behavior under each failover case, not only unicast ping” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a stream uses asymmetric unicast routing; multicast forwarding fails intermittently although individual host routes work. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Monitor IGMP membership churn and snooping state when moving clients between VLANs” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a receiver port stops getting multicast because IGMP membership was not processed by the access switch after an interface move. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Keep an approved multicast group allocation and test boundary enforcement after routing changes” belongs to a separate IP Multicast issue: a financial multicast feed intended for one campus crosses the WAN because no boundary controls are configured. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 897
Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: An ABR starts leaking a management static route into the enterprise IGP after a permissive export term was introduced.
- Restrict the export policy to explicit approved route prefixes and protocols, then check external LSAs.
- Record a successful IPv4 echo response as conclusive proof that OSPFv3 is healthy.
- Set a blanket export accept action and rely on other routers to ignore sensitive prefixes.
- Raise interface OSPF costs without resolving the duplicated router IDs.
- Only authorized static prefixes appear as OSPF externals; management prefixes remain local.
- Use named prefix lists and regression tests for approved and denied redistribution cases.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Correction: Unrestricted OSPF export policy can originate unintended external routes, changing enterprise reachability.
E:Confirmation: Restrict the export policy to explicit approved route prefixes and protocols, then check external LSAs.
F:Prevention of recurrence: Unrestricted OSPF export policy can originate unintended external routes, changing enterprise reachability.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Record a successful IPv4 echo response as conclusive proof that OSPFv3 is healthy” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an IPv6 branch outage is misdiagnosed using only IPv4 pings, despite OSPFv3 neighbors using IPv6 link-local messaging. It is not a valid fix here.
C:“Set a blanket export accept action and rely on other routers to ignore sensitive prefixes” does not address unrestricted OSPF export policy can originate unintended external routes, changing enterprise reachability.
D:“Raise interface OSPF costs without resolving the duplicated router IDs” is an unsafe response to a different problem: two newly deployed distribution switches report identical OSPF router IDs, causing inconsistent LSAs in the area. It is not a valid fix here.
Question 898
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? A switch assigns a misconfigured laptop with incorrect EAP credentials to a VLAN intended only for devices that never attempt 802.1X.
- Require inventory ownership and anomaly monitoring for MAC RADIUS exceptions.
- Review authorization policies for MAC endpoints against a least-privilege access matrix.
- Treat rejected credentials and no-supplicant detection as the same unconditional guest-access event.
- Separate EAP silence, reject and timeout counters in authentication operational monitoring.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The tempting alternative fails because guest, server-reject and server-fail outcomes represent different causes and require distinct supported policies. The supported action is to check authentication result classification and map the rejected user to an appropriate deny or reject response.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to a printer's MAC address is duplicated by an unauthorized endpoint that obtains the same weak MAC-based policy.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
B:That prevention measure relates to a legacy printer can join after MAC authentication yet is allowed to reach sensitive management segments.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
D:That prevention measure relates to a RADIUS server reports no Access-Request for a silent legacy terminal, while switch timers show no EAP response.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Question 899
Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: A core node shows a missing route while remote LSDBs include the corresponding external LSA after a local policy change.
- Advertise an arbitrary wide aggregate that includes unrelated networks to make the missing route disappear.
- Compare LSDB advertisements with local route policy and inet.0 state; correct the intended import filter.
- Change only BGP keepalive values and assume OSPF timers automatically follow.
- Record both LSDB presence and local RIB installation in OSPF troubleshooting runbooks.
- The expected prefix becomes active locally while unwanted external prefixes remain filtered.
- Change the remote area's physical cabling before checking local route filtering.
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Correction: Local import policy can affect installed route visibility independently of the remote origination of LSAs.
D:Prevention of recurrence: Local import policy can affect installed route visibility independently of the remote origination of LSAs.
E:Confirmation: Compare LSDB advertisements with local route policy and inet.0 state; correct the intended import filter.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Advertise an arbitrary wide aggregate that includes unrelated networks to make the missing route disappear” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an ABR stops advertising a branch prefix into the backbone after an OSPF area-range summary is configured incorrectly. It is not a valid fix here.
C:“Change only BGP keepalive values and assume OSPF timers automatically follow” is an unsafe response to a different problem: two OSPF routers on a shared transit segment report different Hello and dead intervals and never establish adjacency. It is not a valid fix here.
F:“Change the remote area's physical cabling before checking local route filtering” does not address local import policy can affect installed route visibility independently of the remote origination of LSAs.
Question 900
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? Equal candidate BGP routes are visible but no multipath forwarding entry is installed because eligibility or policy differs.
- Add a second BGP neighbor and assume the forwarding table automatically load-balances every route.
- Maintain community inventories and test outbound policy outcomes for allowed and denied prefixes.
- Maintain expected BGP attribute decisions for every primary/secondary transit policy.
- Use multivariable path-selection lab tests before changing MED-based policy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The tempting alternative fails because BGP equal-cost multipath requires appropriate configured support and matching eligible path attributes, not merely two established sessions. The supported action is to compare BGP best-path and multipath eligibility conditions, then enable approved multipath behavior and validate forwarding.
Incorrect Answers
B:That prevention measure relates to a network marks a customer route with a community but an export policy ignores the community, leaking the route to another peer.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
C:That prevention measure relates to a branch dual-transit design sees the higher-preference provider route win even though its AS path has more hops.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
D:That prevention measure relates to an engineer incorrectly assumes a lower MED overrides a larger LOCAL_PREF, when both transit candidates are eligible.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests