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Question 380
The team believes it has resolved this Junos issue: A network replacement changes VSTP root elections, causing backup links to forward for a critical VLAN. Which observation best verifies the specific intended result?
- Two isolated tenant ports cannot reach each other but can reach the permitted gateway uplink.
- The VLAN registration propagates to the intended downstream trunk and reaches its member ports.
- Root and forwarding roles match the approved topology under normal and failover conditions.
- The customer control protocol reaches the far endpoint without altering the provider's own spanning-tree topology.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Root and forwarding roles match the approved topology under normal and failover conditions. This checks the relevant result after compare bridge priority, VLAN or MSTI root and port path costs against design; adjust deliberately.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Two isolated tenant ports cannot reach each other but can reach the permitted gateway uplink” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a shared guest access VLAN allows two untrusted hotel-room ports to communicate directly, violating the isolation design. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“The VLAN registration propagates to the intended downstream trunk and reaches its member ports” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a new switch automatically discovers VLAN registrations on one trunk, but an intermediate trunk lacks MVRP participation and blocks the VLAN. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“The customer control protocol reaches the far endpoint without altering the provider's own spanning-tree topology” belongs to a separate Ethernet Switching and Spanning Tree issue: a private L2 service must extend customer control protocols, yet the provider fabric consumes or drops the customer's BPDUs. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 381
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? A security function needs to classify a subset of traffic by source and destination criteria rather than trusted external markings.
- Keep queue drop-profile acceptance tests and monitor production congestion before broad rollout.
- Test ingress classification separately from egress rewrite at every trust boundary.
- Differentiate ingress policing from egress shaping when designing bandwidth controls.
- Trust arbitrary user DSCP markings as proof every packet belongs in the high-priority class.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The tempting alternative fails because multifield classification can use packet fields for policy distinctions beyond incoming BA header code-point classification. The supported action is to use a permitted firewall or multifield classifier matching the approved traffic fields and assign its forwarding class.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to a RED drop profile is applied too aggressively and drops packets even under moderate load.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
B:That prevention measure relates to a provider handoff expects specific code-point markings yet a trunk rewrites every service class to default behavior.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
C:That prevention measure relates to a guest network should be rate-limited at ingress, but engineers configure only an egress shaper on the uplink.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Question 382
To prevent recurrence of this precise networking failure, which practice should be adopted? An engineer copies legacy 802.1X fallback settings to a platform whose supported feature matrix excludes them.
- Classify interactive and headless endpoint requirements before choosing the access method.
- Monitor RADIUS reachability and validate each switch's authentication server profile during onboarding.
- Track hardware, software edition and port family when standardizing access policies.
- Verify RADIUS attribute handling and model/release feature support before rolling out dynamic assignment.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Track hardware, software edition and port family when standardizing access policies. This guards against 802.1X guest and fallback capabilities are platform and Junos variant specific; unsupported features must not be assumed.
Incorrect Answers
A:“Classify interactive and headless endpoint requirements before choosing the access method” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a noninteractive sensor is trapped in captive-portal onboarding because operators selected browser authentication for all endpoints. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“Monitor RADIUS reachability and validate each switch's authentication server profile during onboarding” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: a campus access interface keeps a compliant supplicant blocked while EAP requests never reach the expected authentication backend. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Verify RADIUS attribute handling and model/release feature support before rolling out dynamic assignment” belongs to a separate Layer 2 Authentication and Access Control issue: an EAP-compliant endpoint authenticates while the required policy attribute is absent or ignored in switch port authorization. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 383
Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: A branch link should pace scheduled traffic to a slower uplink yet the team only drops excess packets abruptly.
- Plan buffer and shaping rates against provider handoff capacity and expected burst size.
- Configure supported egress shaping at the bottleneck and verify throughput and queue behavior.
- Create a scheduler definition in configuration but never bind the scheduler map to egress interfaces.
- Outgoing traffic conforms to the contracted rate with acceptable delay and fewer burst losses.
- Trust arbitrary user DSCP markings as proof every packet belongs in the high-priority class.
- Assume any policing rule provides the same paced, buffered behavior as egress shaping.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Prevention of recurrence: Shaping buffers and schedules outgoing traffic to a rate, unlike policing which marks or discards traffic exceeding a contract.
B:Correction: Shaping buffers and schedules outgoing traffic to a rate, unlike policing which marks or discards traffic exceeding a contract.
D:Confirmation: Configure supported egress shaping at the bottleneck and verify throughput and queue behavior.
Incorrect Answers
C:“Create a scheduler definition in configuration but never bind the scheduler map to egress interfaces” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a campus has configured forwarding classes and schedulers but one uplink carries all traffic through default service because association is missing. It is not a valid fix here.
E:“Trust arbitrary user DSCP markings as proof every packet belongs in the high-priority class” is an unsafe response to a different problem: an application needs priority regardless of incoming DSCP, but an interface uses only a header-based classifier. It is not a valid fix here.
F:“Assume any policing rule provides the same paced, buffered behavior as egress shaping” does not address shaping buffers and schedules outgoing traffic to a rate, unlike policing which marks or discards traffic exceeding a contract.
Question 384
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A fabric advertises Type 3 routes and claims this proves specific remote host MACs are reachable. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Inspect the route type appropriate to the claimed control-plane information instead of treating all EVPN NLRIs equally.
- Inspect shared ESI, DF election and Ethernet-segment routes, then correct the multihoming configuration.
- Repair authorized underlay routing to remote VTEPs and check tunnel reachability before changing EVPN policies.
- Check relevant BGP EVPN Type 2 advertisements, MAC mobility updates and import policy for the affected bridge domain.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:EVPN route types carry different information: Type 1 Ethernet auto-discovery, Type 2 MAC/IP, Type 3 inclusive multicast. Verify this by checking that the expected MAC/IP binding is visible in Type 2 while multihoming and BUM state use their own route types.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Inspect shared ESI, DF election and Ethernet-segment routes, then correct the multihoming configuration” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: an EVPN multihomed endpoint creates duplicate forwarding when two leafs both forward the same BUM traffic without appropriate split-horizon behavior. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Repair authorized underlay routing to remote VTEPs and check tunnel reachability before changing EVPN policies” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: a VXLAN overlay's BGP EVPN routes are present, but the underlay cannot route to a remote VTEP loopback. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Check relevant BGP EVPN Type 2 advertisements, MAC mobility updates and import policy for the affected bridge domain” instead concerns another network scenario: A new endpoint MAC is learned at a remote VTEP but never reaches the receiving leaf's EVPN control-plane table. It does not address the requirement here.
Question 385
A network change is required for the following specific situation: A shared Ethernet segment loses its fast convergence properties after an ESI-LAG peer receives an inconsistent configuration. Which corrective action is most appropriate?
- Align the intended ESI and supported LAG mode, then inspect relevant EVPN Type 1 and Type 4 routes.
- Check relevant BGP EVPN Type 2 advertisements, MAC mobility updates and import policy for the affected bridge domain.
- Repair authorized underlay routing to remote VTEPs and check tunnel reachability before changing EVPN policies.
- Inspect Type 3 routes and VNI import/export membership; repair the intended inclusive-multicast advertisement.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:EVPN Ethernet segment identifiers associate redundant attachments with one multihoming segment and support coordinated convergence. Verify this by checking that both peers report a consistent Ethernet segment and failover preserves authorized connectivity.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Check relevant BGP EVPN Type 2 advertisements, MAC mobility updates and import policy for the affected bridge domain” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: a host moves between leafs and the destination leaf still forwards toward the previous MAC location. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Repair authorized underlay routing to remote VTEPs and check tunnel reachability before changing EVPN policies” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: a VXLAN overlay's BGP EVPN routes are present, but the underlay cannot route to a remote VTEP loopback. It does not explain the condition tested here.
D:“Inspect Type 3 routes and VNI import/export membership; repair the intended inclusive-multicast advertisement” belongs to a separate EVPN issue: a bridge domain has valid unicast Type 2 entries yet remote VTEPs do not discover a new participating segment for BUM forwarding. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 386
A Junos enterprise team investigates this incident: BGP peers exchange IPv4 NLRI correctly but a planned IPv6 customer route never appears in inet6.0. Which technical explanation most directly identifies the cause or design principle?
- LOCAL_PREF is an intra-AS BGP attribute, not a value routinely advertised to external BGP neighbors.
- BGP next-hop resolution must use the appropriate address family; IPv4 routes do not automatically resolve IPv6 next hops.
- Junos normally exports active routes; advertise-inactive can expose a best BGP candidate that lost to another protocol.
- BGP address-family negotiation controls which IPv4 or IPv6 NLRI can be exchanged independently of session state.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:BGP address-family negotiation controls which IPv4 or IPv6 NLRI can be exchanged independently of session state. The appropriate response is to enable the intended inet6 family consistently on eligible BGP peers and verify route policy and inet6.0.
Incorrect Answers
A:“LOCAL_PREF is an intra-AS BGP attribute, not a value routinely advertised to external BGP neighbors” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an operator tries to make a remote AS prefer one inbound path using LOCAL_PREF that the remote eBGP peer never receives. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“BGP next-hop resolution must use the appropriate address family; IPv4 routes do not automatically resolve IPv6 next hops” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: an IPv6 transit prefix is hidden because its next-hop address is absent from the correct IPv6 routing table. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“Junos normally exports active routes; advertise-inactive can expose a best BGP candidate that lost to another protocol” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a BGP export policy advertises a prefix that exists only as an inactive local candidate, despite an expectation of default active-only behavior. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 387
The team believes it has resolved this Junos issue: A Junos route is hidden by import policy, but the team troubleshoots only local physical interfaces. Which observation best verifies the specific intended result?
- The selected BGP route reflects the intended higher LOCAL_PREF, and traceroute follows the approved exit.
- The expected IPv6 prefix is received in inet6.0 while IPv4 route exchange remains unchanged.
- The previously hidden BGP prefix resolves its next hop and becomes an eligible route.
- The desired received prefix is accepted and active while intentionally blocked prefixes stay rejected.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The desired received prefix is accepted and active while intentionally blocked prefixes stay rejected. This checks the relevant result after inspect hidden-route reason, incoming attributes and import-policy decisions, then correct the authorized match.
Incorrect Answers
A:“The selected BGP route reflects the intended higher LOCAL_PREF, and traceroute follows the approved exit” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: two iBGP exits offer equal reachable routes but the one with higher LOCAL_PREF is not the egress an operator expected. It does not explain the condition tested here.
B:“The expected IPv6 prefix is received in inet6.0 while IPv4 route exchange remains unchanged” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a campus router's BGP IPv6 session is Established yet peers advertise only inet unicast family routes. It does not explain the condition tested here.
C:“The previously hidden BGP prefix resolves its next hop and becomes an eligible route” belongs to a separate Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) issue: a new IPv4 BGP prefix has a valid AS path but cannot become active after the IGP stops carrying its next-hop address. It does not explain the condition tested here.
Question 388
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? A PIM sparse-mode segment cannot maintain neighbor state because PIM is configured on the wrong routed interface.
- Include source address changes in SSM subscription-management procedures.
- Measure receiver interest and multicast forwarding state before scaling new one-to-many services.
- Create an IGMP group entry alone and expect it to establish PIM adjacency between routers.
- Document whether multicast RPF uses inet.0 or inet.2 and verify after topology changes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The tempting alternative fails because PIM routing adjacencies require appropriate protocol participation on the actual routed interfaces used for the distribution tree. The supported action is to enable PIM on the approved routed VLAN interface and inspect neighbor and join state.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to a campus multicast application migrates ASM clients to SSM but does not update the source-qualified membership requests.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
B:That prevention measure relates to a trading-data sender needs to serve many local subscribers, but each listener receives its own redundant copy over the backbone.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
D:That prevention measure relates to a campus uses a separate inet.2 multicast RPF table and investigators inspect only inet.0, overlooking a stale source route.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Question 389
Select THREE complementary corrective, verification, or preventive controls for this scenario: A desk phone sends tagged voice traffic, but the switchport permits only the untagged data VLAN.
- Configure an approved voice VLAN on the port while keeping the PC data VLAN constrained.
- Put the phone and PC on one unrestricted VLAN to avoid checking voice VLAN tagging.
- Allocate identical priority to all PoE consumers and assume emergency devices receive preferential power.
- Test both tagged phone frames and untagged PC frames during phone-port commissioning.
- The phone receives voice service on its tagged VLAN and the PC remains on its separate data VLAN.
- Assume generic LLDP chassis identification alone announces the correct voice VLAN and QoS settings.
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Correction: Voice/data split depends on compatible VLAN membership, accepted 802.1Q tagging and endpoint network policy.
D:Prevention of recurrence: Voice/data split depends on compatible VLAN membership, accepted 802.1Q tagging and endpoint network policy.
E:Confirmation: Configure an approved voice VLAN on the port while keeping the PC data VLAN constrained.
Incorrect Answers
B:“Put the phone and PC on one unrestricted VLAN to avoid checking voice VLAN tagging” does not address voice/data split depends on compatible VLAN membership, accepted 802.1Q tagging and endpoint network policy.
C:“Allocate identical priority to all PoE consumers and assume emergency devices receive preferential power” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a switch assigns equal PoE power priority to every port and disconnects an emergency phone before low-priority signage during a power shortage. It is not a valid fix here.
F:“Assume generic LLDP chassis identification alone announces the correct voice VLAN and QoS settings” is an unsafe response to a different problem: a newly deployed IP phone joins the data network because the switch does not advertise the intended voice VLAN through LLDP-MED. It is not a valid fix here.
Question 390
Which suggested shortcut would be especially unsafe for this exact situation? A distribution node learns connected subnets but never sends Hello packets on its OSPF transit port due to passive-interface policy.
- Keep IPv4 and IPv6 routing verification separate for dual-stack maintenance.
- Include a checklist of advertised IPv6 service and loopback addresses in OSPFv3 acceptance.
- Test one allowed and one forbidden route against each export policy term before deployment.
- Make every edge interface active to OSPF regardless of whether a routing peer exists.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The tempting alternative fails because making a link passive suppresses OSPF adjacency formation even when its prefix remains eligible for advertisement. The supported action is to remove passive behavior only from the approved router-to-router transit link and check Hello and neighbor states.
Incorrect Answers
A:That prevention measure relates to an IPv6 branch outage is misdiagnosed using only IPv4 pings, despite OSPFv3 neighbors using IPv6 link-local messaging.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
B:That prevention measure relates to OSPFv3 peering comes up but the desired IPv6 loopback is not in the routing database after a rollout.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
C:That prevention measure relates to an OSPF export term filters routes based on the wrong protocol, so an intended static default is not originated.; it is not the unsafe shortcut described here.
Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests